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ILLINOIS IN THE 1980s: SHIFT TOWARD SLOW
POPULATION GROWTH AND HIGH OUTMIGRATION
A. J. Sofranko, J. C. van Es, and M. Flotow
Since 1980, there has been a gradual deterioration of
several key demographic trends in all midwestern states,
including Illinois. The midwest is now experiencing an
unprecedented rate of low population growth. New
households are being formed at a rate less than half that
of the U.S. Outmigration is the highest among the
nation's regions, and population growth is lower in both
the urban and rural areas of the region than in the nation.
For Illinois, growth in the 1980s will be the lowest since
the turn of the century. This Policy Forum documents
population change in Illinois, against regional and nation-
al trends, and presents demographic trends important for
economic development and state taxing and spending
policies.
The Nation and Midwest at Mid-Decade
National population growth has gradually slowed over
several decades, from an average annual growth rate of
nearly 2% per year in the 1950s to 1% per year so far in
the 1980s. The slowdown in population is attributable to
the leveling of the birthrate, delayed marriage and
childbearing and lower inmigration. Growth also has be-
come more regional and even state-specific. For ex-
ample, California, Texas and Florida together accounted
for more than half of the national growth.
The rate of population growth in the midwest has
declined more sharply than the nation's, as economic
recovery has been slow and declines in manufacturing
employment continue (Figure 1). Through the first half
of the 1980s, every midwestern state experienced net out-
migration, and consequently the region grows only
through natural increase (births minus deaths). The mid-
west is now a major "migration loser" with three states
(Michigan, Ohio, Iowa) actually losing population the
first half of the 1980s. During this period, the three states
with the largest net outmigration in the nation were in the
midwest: Michigan (-496,000), Ohio (-401,000) and Il-
linois (-320,000). Between 1980 and 1987, Illinois lost
420,000 persons due to outmigration, exceeding in seven
years the outmigration of the entire previous decade by
40,000 people.
Figure 1. Average Annual Population
Growth. 1950-87, for the U.S.. Midwest,
and Illinois
percent
During the 1970s, rural areas grew slightly faster than
urban areas, but in the 1980s a reversion to the pattern of
predominantly urban growth (which extended for over a
century) has occurred. The past 25 years of urban and
rural growth at the national, regional and state levels are
represented in Figure 2. Urban growth in the nation is
less than half what it was in the 1960s, and in the region it
is but a small fraction of the 1960s level. In the 1980s, Il-
linois actually had a slight increase in urban growth over
the 1970-80 rate, but the rate ofgrowth is far less than that
of the 1960s. Urban areas grew by 1% a year during the
1970s, nationwide, but rural areas outpaced this level with
a 1.3% average growth rate. The rural rate has fallen to
.8% per year since 1980, which is less than urban areas
and less than in the 1970s, but still higher than national
rural rates in the 1960s.
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Implications of Demographic Trends
During the first half of the 1980s, population growth in
the midwest and in Illinois has been negligible. Out-
migration, which has become the norm, accelerated.
Rural-urban trends of the 1970s, which were felt to herald
a revitalization of small towns and the countryside, have
reversed and the presumed beneficial effects of rural
growth are now questionable. Even urban growth is sub-
stantially lower in the region than in the nation, and much
of that growth reflects a continued shift to suburbs. A
consequence of these trends is the selective loss of per-
sons in the young adult age groups and reductions in the
formation of new households.
Many of these regional trends did not first appear in
the 1980s, but reflect underlying decades-old preferences
for the sunbelt regions, as well as the historical depend-
ence among midwestern states and Illinois on manufac-
turing, construction and agriculture for employment.
While these conditions may be reversed over time, there
is not much evidence of a reversal in the 1980s, as trends
continue to deepen. The 1990 census will document this
historically distinct period in midwestern and Illinois
demographics.
Thus far in the 1980s, Illinois has been characterized
by slow and geographically concentrated population
growth and historically high outmigration. Over the past
four decades, the state has changed from growth based
on both natural increase and net inmigration, to a com-
plete reliance on natural increase to offset higher levels
of net outmigration. However, the rate of natural in-
crease has been declining over the past four decades.
Much of that natural increase is in Cook County, specifi-
cally the City of Chicago. Combining a declining rate of
natural increase with high outmigration has resulted in
what promises to be the lowest Illinois population growth
rate for any decade in this century.
Were it not for its selective nature, migration would be
a relatively benign factor in population dynamics. Inter-
state migrants, however, typically are in the younger,
working-age age groups, they are better educated, and
have more marketable skills. Consequently, when a state
loses population through outmigration it loses persons in
the prime age and educational groups, and this clearly af-
fects the state's human capital base. Migration flows are
also indicative of the relative distribution of amenities and
opportunities. In particular, migration has been in-
timately linked to employment opportunities. Between
1976 and 1986 the average rate at which employment grew
in Illinois lagged behind 48 other states. Given the over-
riding importance of employment in population reten-
tion, the present high outmigration will not subside until
the employment climate changes.
While statewide population growth is negligible, and
outmigration high, what growth there is is concentrated
in the Chicago metropolitan area. The metropolitan
counties surrounding Chicago are growing via both in-
migration and natural increase, as these areas are
demonstrating a continued capacity for attracting and
retaining younger persons and families of childbearing
ages. These areas will set the stage for continued growth,
higher school enrollments, and the attraction of younger
and better educated populations.
The reverse side of this phenomenon is downstate
population loss. Not every metropolitan area outside
Chicago is losing population, nor are all rural counties.
However, most are and, collectively, they have fared
much worse this decade than the suburban areas around
Chicago. As younger people leave and populations age,
the hundreds of small towns and rural places that dot the
Illinois landscape will find it increasingly difficult to at-
tract, or even retain, younger persons and families, busi-
nesses and firms, or to support the types of improvements
in services people demand. There are very few indica-
tions of an immanent reversal.
Sofranko and van Es are Professors in the Dept. of
Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, and Flotow is Demographer in the Office of
Health Policy andPlanning Illinois Dept. ofPublic Health.
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COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GOOD AND BAD?
/. Fred Giertz and David L. Chicoine
Interjurisdictional fiscal competition for jobs and in-
come has become a source of interest and concern. This
is, in part, the result of state and local governments' in-
creasing emphasis in recent years on promoting economic
development. Pursuing economic development has led
to unprecedented rivalries among jurisdictions. At least
emporarily, the pace of events has outstripped the ability
to understand and evaluate the situation.
The list of tax and financial incentives grows with each
legislative year. States use direct grants and customized
manpower training to wide ranging tax exemptions,
credits, abatements and special treatment (Table 1).
Table 1. State Industrial Incentives
Direct Financial Incentives Number of States
Industrial Development Bonds 45
Direct State Loans 27
Loan Guarantees 16
State Grants 14
Customized Industrial Training 42
Other Financing Programs 13
Tax Exemptions. Deductions. Credits
Goods In Transit 42
Industrial Fuels and Raw Materials 43
Industrial Machinery and Equipment 42
Pollution Control Equipment 40
Energy and Fuel Conservation Measures 37
Business Inventory 36
Property Tax Abatement 31
Investment Tax Credit 20
Research and Development 14
Job Creation Tax Credit 17
Other 30
Source: DeWitt John. 1087. Shlitinz Re Bponslbllitles:
Federalism in Economic Development. NGA.
Washington, D.C.
Competition among governments for economic ac-
tivity is nothing new. In 1791, New Jersey granted tax ex-
emptions to new firms and their employees as a way to
stimulate investment. States have long invested in educa-
tion and public infrastructure. What is new is the expan-
sion in the 1980s of the instruments of competition and
the growth in their dollar value. It is difficult to accurate-
ly estimate the value of the maze of financial and tax in-
centives. Their costs are dispersed across state agency
budgets, in off-budget commissions and in tax expendi-
tures. The value of tax expenditures by local government
through property tax abatements is virtually never as-
sessed. As an example, a 10-year 100% property tax
abatement for one east central Illinois plant employing
135 saved the company $72,197 in the first year. If this is
the annual average for the ten years, the value of the sub-
sidy is an estimated $5,350 per employee ($721,970 total
abatement). Because the abatement likely increases
plant profits, both the federal and the state government
benefit from the abatement through increased income tax
receipts.
The National Association of State Development
Agencies (NASDA) publishes an estimate of state fund-
ing of economic development. As shown in Figure 1, the
average state economic development agency budget in-
creased from $2.1 million in 1970 to an estimated $18.5
million in 1986 (the most recently published survey).
Figure 1
Average State Economic Development
Agency Budget, 1970-1986
(millions of t)
•l«.6
1S78 IB02
Fiscal Year
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State development agency budgets include incentives
designed to attract businesses or to retain them (Table 2).
Advertising is a major expenditure. In 1986 the 47 states
participating in the NASDA survey spent $32.1 million in
advertising for industrial development and an additional
$84.1 million (spent by 36, not the 47 states) for promot-
ing tourism. Total 1986 state economic development
agency appropriations for the 47 states in the NASDA
survey amounted to $839.1 million. In 1986, Illinois
reported $187.3 million in appropriations.
Table 2. Economic Development Spending by
Illinois and 47 Other State Governnment*. 1986*
Illinois Other States
(millions of •)
State Appropriation •187.3 •839.1
Expaodlturc by Function
Industrial Development tsa.a • 194.0
International Development 3.0 3S.3
Tourism 19.2 176.8
Eoonomlo Research .3 17.0
Local/Regional Development 49.2 103.8
Film Promotion .4 8.8
Manpower Training 12.1 47.8
Advertising
Industrial 2.0 32.1
Tourism lO.O 84.1
* Massachusetts. New Hampshire and Tenneaaee did not
participate In the 1988 survey. Illinois did not
participate In the 1988 survey, so this Is the only
Information available.
Source: 1986 State Development Agency Expenditure
end Salary Survey, NASDA. Washington, D.C.
State tax and fiscal incentives for economic develop-
ment are now expected in the competition between politi-
cal jurisdictions. A $39.8 million incentive package, for
example, was recently announced by Illinois' economic
development agency as partially responsible for the loca-
tion of a new radial tire plant in southern Illinois.
Employing 450 at full production, the incentive packages
provides a subsidy of $88,440 per employee.
Competition: Good? Bad? or Both?
Understanding competition among governments re-
quires answers to several questions. First, observers have
been hard pressed to clearly explain the role of state and
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local governments in promoting development.
Moreover, the effectiveness of development incentives
has not been admitted until recently, nor are their dis-
tributional effects well understood. Finally, there is no
agreement about the overall effects on economic welfare
of interjurisdictional rivalries or on the appropriate
public policies to respond to this phenomenon.
Answers to some of these questions have begun to
emerge. However, there is as yet no consensus on
whether interjurisdictional competition should be
restricted. Economic development incentives are just a
special case of policy rivalry among governments.
State/Local Governments and Economic
Development
State and local governments compete among them-
selves for economic development in a variety of ways.
There are hundreds of different types of programs and
policies designed to promote various types of economic
development. These are often highly specific, providing
unique benefits to particular firms. In addition, many
general programs such as tax reform or educational en-
hancement are justified on economic development
grounds.
Two questions arise immediately: Why do jurisdic-
tions offer such incentives? Are such incentives effective
(even from the narrow view of the state or local govern-
ment)?
The Rationale for Incentives. In response to the first
question, it is instructive to apply the normative analysis
from public finance that provides a rationale for govern-
ment activity to remedy failures of the private market.
Market failures may result from monopoly, the presence
of public goods and non-internalized externalities, as well
as problems created by incomplete markets and imper-
fect information. These potential failures only introduce
the possibility that government intervention can improve
resource allocation. So-called governmental failures
may, in certain cases, lead to worse outcomes than market
failures.
Does market failure explain the type of intervention
manifested in aggressive economic development under-
taken by state and local governments? In general, no. If
governments concentrated development efforts on build-
inghuman and non-human capital through education and
infrastructure improvements, development policies and
programs could be viewed as a response to public goods
or externality problems. However, these activities do not
usually characterize the more narrowly focused develop-
ment efforts of states and localities.
As an illustration, government credit assistance is
granted because of alleged imperfections in capital
markets. Somehow, private financial institutions sys-
tematically underestimate the credit worthiness of viable
firms and thus retard development. Government credit
assistance asserts that governments are better able to
judge the economic potential of firms than is the private
market. Such assertions are difficult to accept, however.
To argue that systematic failures (not related to exter-
nalities or public goods) occur in ordinary investment
decisions would seem to call into question the efficacy of
the market system. No explanation is given as to how
financial markets, in most other areas thought to be high-
ly efficient, are somehow inferior to the evaluations of
state and local officials. Not surprisingly, targeted incen-
tives are often awarded by governments based on politi-
cal considerations, not development potential.
If the market failure analysis does not provide an ac-
ceptable rationale for governmental development efforts,
what are the alternatives? One obvious alternative is to
view these activities as an attempt to use the political sys-
tem to redistribute resources from one group to another
within jurisdictions. This may be part of an attempt to al-
leviate the distress of the disadvantaged or it may simply
be a technique to grant favors to politically well-con-
nected groups. Redistribution is clearly not an unimpor-
tant motive, but it is unlikely to explain the pervasiveness
of development efforts.
Another possible explanation is to view development
incentives as a piece meal response to problems con-
fronted by jurisdictions that attempt to use ability-to-pay
taxes when the forces of competition penalize the use of
anything other than benefit-based taxes. Assume that a
local government is attempting to attract a new firm (or
retain an old one), yet the firm's expected profit is less
than it would be in some other location. If the govern-
ment employed benefit taxation with local services
provided at the efficient level, there would be little the
government could or should do to attract (retain) the
firm. However, if non-benefit taxes are used and exceed
the marginal cost to the government of providing services
for the firm, the government may find it advantageous to
negotiate with the firm by granting special inducements.
The result of such activities is a kind of price (tax) dis-
crimination based on relative elasticities of the firms in-
volved. Presumably, highly mobile firms would be able to
push their tax burden toward the benefit level.
Effects of Incentives. The second major question is
the effect of state and local development policies on
various economic decisions. Contrary to the convention-
al wisdom that tax differentials among locations were
unimportant, recent studies have shown that tax and
public service differences among locations do influence
important economic variables. However, these effects
are often subtle and don't offer precise guidance in
designing pro-development policies. Most development
policies have been adopted with little or no research.
They are largely ad hoc.
Most studies have dealt with the effect of tax levels or
changes in tax levels on employment or other measures of
development. More recently, studies have dealt with
more disaggregated, firm-level data. Still, these studies
provide little guidance for evaluating the effects of such
innovations as tax increment financing, enterprise zones,
loan guarantees or equity participation.
It seems clear that targeted development assistance is
potentially effective, at least from the narrow viewpoint
of the jurisdictions offering the subsidies. If overall
general tax levels affect a firm's decisions, targeted assis-
tance, much greater in magnitude, should also have an ef-
fect. However, these governments are often unable to
distinguish between firms that do respond to these incen
tives as compared to firms that use the location promise
(or the departure threat) to exact surpluses from govern-
ment. There is a fundamental asymmetry in information
involved in the bargaining process. Firms have access to
information about the costs they impose and benefits they
bestow on local jurisdictions. Governments, however,
have considerably less information about the alternatives
available to firms. This would likely lead to situations
where firms appropriate much of the fiscal surplus they
create. In summary, development policies can no longer
be dismissed as ineffective from the viewpoint of govern-
ments involved in competition for development, but
state/local governments cannot apply these policies with
any precision.
The General Welfare Effects of
Competition for Development
The fact that competition for development may be in
the self-interest of state/local jurisdictions says little
about the overall welfare effect of such a process on the
country. For many years, the prevailing opinion was that
interjurisdictional competition was counterproductive.
It was often viewed as a zero or even negative sum game
that contributed little to development, but resulted in un-
warranted giveaways to firms while limiting the fiscal dis-
cretion of localities to pursue desirable ends. Tax systems
regressed while local public goods were underprovided.
This contrasted sharply with the Tiebout inspired
analysis of interjurisdictional competition for residents.
Under certain conditions, such as the absence of exter-
nalities and income distribution problems, interjurisdic-
tional competition will force governments toward an
efficient outcome. The Tiebout analysis suggested that
fiscal competition amongjurisdictions for citizens can en-
hance welfare while competition for economic develop-
ment was still viewed as destructive.
Not surprisingly, when a Tiebout type analysis was ap-
plied to the question ofcompetition for economic activity,
similar results were obtained. Jurisdictions are forced to
adopt benefit taxation and, in the absence of interjuris-
dictional externalities, the process will lead to an efficient
allocation of resources. Tax levels for firms provide cor-
rect signals to firms in that they represent the marginal
cost of services provided. These results, however, are
hardly a ringing endorsement for unfettered government
rivalry. The requisite conditions are often not met in the
real world (e.g. the absence of interjurisdictional exter-
nalities). This has led some observers to condemn
government competition for economic activity despite its
potential benefits.
The blame for the failure of competition to achieve op-
timality is often misplaced, however. The failure is not
because of competition, but instead can be attributed to
the lack of appropriate-sized districts to deal with exter-
nality and distributional problems. If an optimal-sized
jurisdiction appropriately dealt with interjurisdictional
externalities and income distribution questions, local
jurisdictions would be free to compete using benefit taxa-
tion with positive effects. If competition leads to failure,
it is not because the process is fatally flawed, but because
there is a failure in the appropriate division of respon-
sibility within the system of governments. Viewed in this
light, limiting competition is a second best attempt to deal
with externality and income redistribution problems.
Policy Implications
The recent analysis of interjurisdictional competition
has led to better understanding of the process and has re-
lated it to conventional and familiar concepts of public
finance. Unfortunately, this work provides little concrete
guidance for planning arid evaluating actual policies and
incentive programs. Interjurisdictional competition for
development can be considered desirable in a world
without externalities or income distribution problems or
in a world where these;problems are resolved by a higher
level government.'
The question is what should be the response when the
real world problems of externalities and income distribu-
tion do exist? In particular, does the failure of competi-
tion to achieve optimality mean that it should be banned
or at least limited? This question can only be answered
in reference to what replaces competition. The argu-
ments against competition are usually based upon com-
parisons of competitive outcomes resulting from
interjurisdictional rivalry to first-best outcomes where
decisions are made by a benevolent and omniscient
central planner whose overall goal is the maximization of
welfare. This is not the appropriate comparison,
however. The elimination of competition would mean
that local jurisdictions would have greater discretion to
pursue the interests of those in power for good or ill.
From a policy perspective,the relevant comparison is be-
tween the existing outcome under rivalry with the actual
outcome that would emerge were it to be banned. This is
likely to be quite different from and inferior to the first-
best world under a benevolent central planner.
Banning state/local government competition for
economic development (even if it were possible) could
well lead to even less desirable results than the inefficien-
cies that persist when it exists. In most cases, competition
can onlybe controlled by the intervention of a higher level
ofgovernment (i.e. the federal government). It is difficult
to believe that such a government could devise and imple-
ment an efficient mechanism to control competition when
the reason such a policy is necessary in the first place is
because of the failure of the same government to control
externalities and redistribute income.
The restraining forces of political competition and fis-
cal resources among state and local governments will be
important in keeping interjurisdictional competition
somewhat bound. The real implication of the growth of
incentive programs is the explosion in demand for analyti-
cal capabilities to guide the most effective use of the tools
of competition. Unfortunately, investment in public
management and assessment capabilities has lagged the
explosion in competitive economic development policies
and programs.
Giertz and Chicoine are members of the Institute of
Government and Public Affairs at the University ofIllinois
at Urbana-Champaign. Giertz is Professor ofEconomics
and Chicoine is Professor and Head of Agricultural
Economics.
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An Economic Perspective of Illinois' Labor Force
Dynamics
Cheng H. Chiang
t LickAny v THc
nov 8m
The sweeping dynamics of Illinois' lat^^tce ©fteBLi/vo,^
provide insight into changes in social and econorarc^fiA/GN
ditions across the state. For example, the increased par-
ticipation of women in the work force has profoundly
changed household structure and the way we live. The
shift in the age composition of the labor force in the 1980s
has affected the productivity and the earnings of labor
throughout Illinois. Change in the size of the labor force
or labor supply affects future job growth and the future
economic wellbeing of the entire state. This issue of
Policy Forum traces these changes through recent
decades and provides a foundation for looking to the next
century and the future performance of the Illinois
economy.
CHANGES IN ILLINOIS' LABOR FORCE
SINCE 1980
Illinois' labor force in the 1980s can be characterized
as slow growing, with declining numbers of young
workers, reduced dominance by men and increasingly
nonwhite.
Slow Growth
One of the most significant changes in the nation's and
Illinois' work force between the 1980s and 1970s is
growth. In Illinois, the labor force grew 6.0% from 1980-
1988, compared to an 18.0% growth in the 1970s (Figure
!)•
For the nation, growth through 1988 was 12.1%,
while in the 1970s the growth was 28.0%. Illinois' share
of the nation's work force has decreased from 5.2% to
4.7% since 1980.
Figure 1. Growth In the Work Force
U.S. and Illinois
P*ro*nt lnor*»«
Slower growth in the labor force in Illinois is not explained
by slow population growth alone. The slower growth in the
labor force is attributed to the difference in the growth of the
working-aged population (age 16 and over). The number of
labor force entrants reached a record high in the 1970s and
declined sharply thereafter, reflecting the second stage in the
life cycle of the baby boom generation. Consequently, the
working-aged population grewby 90,000 per year in the 1970s,
compared to about 41,000 per year between 1980 and 1988.
A smaller increase in labor force participation also con-
tributed to the slower rate of labor force growth. The par-
ticipation rate increased about 2.4% for the period 1980-1988
(rising from 63.9% to65.4%) compared to an increase of6.6%
in the 1970s.
The smaller increase in Illinois' labor force participation
rate is due to continued decline in male labor force participa-
tion rate (dropping from 77.3% in 1980 to about 75.8% in
1988); smaller increase in the female labor force participation
rate; and the continued increase in the share of nonwhites in
the population. Nonwhites generally have lower labor force
participation rates compared to whites.
With Cooperative Extension Service, College ofAgriculture, Urbana-Champaign
Figure 3. Male and Female Labor Force
Participation Rates in Illinois,
1950-1988
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Ethnic Diversity of the Work Force
There are similarities in the dynamics of the labor
force between whites and nonwhites. Both ethnic groups
have experienced slower growth in the work force in the
1980s than 1970s. Both groups lost workers aged over 65,
but experienced a significant increase in the work force
for the baby boom generation. Men's dominance in the
work force, though diminishing, is still obvious for whites
and nonwhites.
Unlike whites, nonwhites did not lose young workers
and workers between 55 and 64. Despite the fact that
nonwhites have had a lower labor force participation rate
than whites (79% for white males vs 70% for nonwhite
males) the nonwhite labor force has been growing at a
faster rate than white. The number of nonwhites in the
labor force has more than tripled, increasing from 287,000
in 1950 to 1,058,000 in 1988. Over the same period, the
white work force increased only 41%, from 3,383,000 to
4,765,000. While the labor force has been growing at a
slower rate in the 1980s for both whites and nonwhites,
the difference in growth rates between the two groups is
striking. The nonwhite labor force grew 20%, from
879,000 in 1980 to 1,058,000 in 1988, while the white labor
force grew only 3%, from 4,618,000 to 4,765,000 (Figure
4.) During this eight-year period, the nonwhite labor
force share increased from 16% to 18%.
The fact that the nonwhite labor force was growing
faster than that of whites is not surprising. Nonwhites
have maintained a substantially higher fertility rate than
whites. Consequently, the nonwhite working aged
population in Illinois grew at a faster rate than white.
While nonwhite working aged population increased 14%,
from 1,478,000 in 1980 to 1,686,000 in 1988, the white
working aged population grew only 2%, from 7,132,000 to
7,252,000.
Men's dominance in the work force has been less
apparent among nonwhites. Among nonwhites, women
accounted for 35% of the work force in 1950, compared
to 29% among whites. This difference has remained and
is representative of all age groups. In 1988, 46% of
nonwhites in the work force were women, compared to
42% for whites. The difference in women's labor force
share between the two ethnic groups is most striking in the age
group 25-54. In this age group, 47% of nonwhites in the work
force were women, compared to 40% for whites.
Figure 4. Illinois Labor Force Growth
by Race, 1980-1988.
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FUTURE OUTLOOK OF ILLINOIS WORK FORCE
The baby boom generation will continue to shape the age
composition of the nation's as well as Illinois' labor force,
resulting in a slow-growing Illinois' labor force for years to
come. Men's dominance of the work force will continue to
weaken and nonwhites will continue to increase their labor
force share.
With the baby boom generation now working-aged, major
changes in the Illinois working-aged population in the next 20
years depend upon future migration. Illinois has been ex-
periencing heavy net out-migration for nearly two decades. In
the 1980s, Illinois, on average, lost 60,000 people annually.
Nearly 80% of this net out-migration was of working age.
Should this migration trend persist into the next decade, the
working-aged population in Illinois may reach 9.2 million by
the end of this century, an increase of about 260,000, or only
3% more than the current level. Although this increase is
smaller than in the 1980s, it is expected to translate into a
growth in the labor force which is as large as the growth
experienced in the 1980s due to the continued increase in the
labor force participation rate of women.
Changes in the age composition of Illinois' labor force in
the next 10 years that are likely are:
• a continued loss of young workers aged 20-24, but at a
slower rate (about 10% less the current level).
• persons between 25 and 54 years old will be the only
major age group contributing to the increase in the work
force (about 12% more than the current level).
• the number of persons aged 65 and over in the labor
force is expected to decline sharply (about 20% less
than the current level), despite the fact that the number
of persons in this age group will increase considerably.
• the number of persons aged 55-64 in the labor force is
expected to experience a small increase (about 3%
more than the current level).
• the change in the number of teenage workers is ex-
pected to be negligible.
Decline in Young Workers
The slow growth in the labor force in the 1980s was
not characteristic of all age groups. While some age
groups experienced a decline, others experienced sub-
stantial growth. In Illinois, the number of persons be-
tween 16 and 19 in the labor force has declined by 21%
since 1980 (Figure 2). Accompanying this decline is a
decrease of about 14% for the 20-24 age group. In con-
trast, the labor force between 24 and 54 years of age rose
sharply (18%). This age group is largely composed of the
baby boom generation.
Figure 2. Change in Illinois' Labor
Force by Age 1980-1988
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This growth pattern reflects the effect on the labor
force of the baby boom generation. On one hand, the
number of persons between 16 and 24 who entered the
labor force in the middle of the 1980s and thereafter was
considerably smaller than their counterparts of the baby
boom generation. This resulted in a sharp decline in the
number of young workers. On the other hand, the aging
of the baby boom generation substantially increased the
labor force aged 25-54, as this generation moved from age
groups with low labor force participation rates into the
ones with higher participation rates.
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A substantial proportion of the large increase in the labor
force between 25 and 54 was offset by declines in the labor
force for the age group 16-24, and the age group 55 + . The
result was slow growth in the total labor force in the 1980s.
The decrease in the labor force for the age group 55 + simply
reflects early retirement. Although the Illinois population
aged 55 and over increased by more than 100,000 from 1980
to 1988, persons in this age group who were in the labor force
dropped by 76,000.
As a result of the different patterns of growth by age
groups, the age composition of Illinois' labor force has under-
gone changes that are unique to the 1980s. Unlike earlier
decades, the work force in the 1980s is maturing, primarily
because persons between 25 and 54 are gaining a significantly
larger share of the work force at the expense of the share of
younger persons. Although the decline in labor force share
for older persons is not unique to the 1980s, the magnitude of
the decline is much more substantial because of the size of the
baby boom generation.
Decline in Men's Dominance in the Work Force
In the 1980s, the baby boom generation created a sizable
increase in the labor force that resulted in a small increase in
the total work force because of the significant decline in
younger and older workers. The increase in the labor force
for men in the 25-54 age group was" 13%, compared to 26%
for women in the same age range (Figure 2). The decrease in
the number of males between 16 and 24 who were in the labor
force was more striking than that of females. Males also
exhibited a more pronounced decrease in the labor force in
the age group 55 + . As a result, male labor force grew about
2% from 1980 to 1988, compared to 12% for females. Of the
total increase in Illinois' work force in the 1980s, males con-
tributed only 17%.
While men of all age groups continued to experience
decline in labor force participation rate, females, except for
age group 65 + , continued their growth in labor force par-
ticipation. The most significant decline in men's labor force
participation rate was in the 55-64 age group and the 65 +
age group. On the other hand, the largest increase in women's
participation was in the 25-54 age group, despite the fact that
women in this age group are of child-bearing age. Overall,
men's labor force participation dropped by 2%, compared to
an increase of 8.5% for women.
Men's traditional domination of the work force is changing
as a result ofthe decline in men's labor force participation rate
and the increase in women's rate. While men's participation
rate in Illinois declined from 83% in 1950 to about 76% in
1988, women's labor force participation rate nearly doubled,
from 32% to 56% (Figure 3). Women do not have to have the
same level of labor force participation as men to obtain equal
representation in the work force. Women have higher life
expectancy and therefore larger working aged populations
compared to men. Thus the female labor force participation
rate of 56% in 1988 yields a female share of the Illinois work
force close to 50%. By 1988, the number ofwomen in the labor
force reached 2.6 million and accounted for 45% of the total
work force, compared to only 29% in 1950.
• by 2000 women in the labor force will reach 2.9
nillion, only 400,000 fewer than men in the labor
force.
General demographic trends suggest the nonwhite
labor force will continue to grow at a faster rate than the
white labor force. Continuation of the higher fertility rate
among nonwhites also suggests a continued faster growth
in nonwhites in the labor force. In 2000, nonwhites are
expected to account for 20% of the total Illinois work
force.
The coming of age among the baby boom generation,
unmistakenly suggests, that the number of workers aged
55-64 will increase sharply in 2010 and so will workers
aged 65 + in 2020, even with the continuous decline in the
labor force participation rate among the elderly. When
this takes place, Illinois' labor force may actually decline.
In any case, the age composition of Illinois' work force
will certainly be very different ....dominated by workers
55 + in age. This is because the generations after the
baby boom generation are too small to exercise the same
influences on labor force dynamics as the baby boom
generation has.
Economic and Policy Implications
Changes in labor force characteristics are closely re-
lated to the social and economic well-being of the state.
Public policies need to be formulated with the anticipa-
tion of the socio-economic effects of the change in the
labor force. Economic performance is directly linked to
labor force dynamics. To the extent that earnings,
productivity, educational attainment and labor use vary
with age, sex and race, changes in these demographic
characteristics of the labor force influence economic
growth in Illinois. Moreover, increased participation in
the labor force by women has had profound effects on
lifestyles and service demands. The increased demand
for child and family services and the increased number of
single parent households are directly and indirectly re-
lated to the increased participation in the labor force by
women.
The dynamics of Illinois' labor force in the 1990s is ex-
pected to be similar to the dynamics of the 1980s.
Policymakers need to anticipate the effects of these dynamics
on social and economic conditions and the related demands
for government services. With the slow growth in the labor
force, a sharp increase in employment in Illinois seems to be
highly unlikely during the next decade. Nor will the un-
employment rate in Illinois jump under normal economic
conditions. While the population base will grow at the same
rate as the 1980s, the age structure of the labor force could be
more favorable for state tax revenue growth in the 1990s. The
continued increase in women's participation in the labor force
may stabilize or even lower the fertility rate, but will likely
create a greater need for child and family services. On the
other hand, it may reduce the need for public assistance such
as aid to families with dependent children . While the decline
in teenagers in the labor force will somewhat ease unemploy-
ment, the extremely low labor force participation rate among
nonwhite youth may continue to present a challenge. Finally,
the combination of the lower labor force participation rate of
nonwhites and the faster growth in the labor force among
nonwhites may force policymakers to look seriously at social
and economic equality in the decades ahead.
Chiang is State Demographer for Illinois Bureau of the
Budget, Springfield, Illinois.
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Auditing Illinois' Marketing Intelligence
ThomasA. Murray, Jr.
llinois as a state is relatively well-off. However, in the
1980s it showed signs of losing its leadership position both
nationally and within the Great Lakes region. For example,
Illinois' population growth is far below the national average.
Per capita income change also lags behind the national
figure. Even so, the state maintains an attractive fiscal base
and taxes, revenues, and state debt run below national
averages. Illinois is certainly not a fiscally loose, "tax and
spend" state.
However, Illinois lost 262300 manufacturing jobs from
1980 through November 1986, which put the state among
the top five states in lost manufacturing workforce. Espe-
cially hard hit were the construction machinery, steel blast
furnace, telephone communications, metal working
machinery, and radio/television equipment sectors of the
state economy. Recovering jobs from the 1982 recession
has been a slow, painful process. But by April, 1989, the
Illinois unemployment rate was 5.3%, compared to 5.4%
nationally.
As part of a "strategic businessplan" for Illinois, a Market
IntelligenceAudit was prepared by the Governor's Commis-
sion on Science and Technology. TheAudit was conducted
by the University of Illinois Institute of Government and
Public Affairs jointly with Chicago Group, a business con-
sulting firm. This issue of Policy Forum presents the find-
ings of theAudit and the implications ofthe findings for state
economic development policy.
TheAudit investigates two proposed solutions to Illinois'
recent economic difficulties. The first is to replace lost
manufacturingjobs with service jobs. The earning disparity
between the average manufacturing job and the average
service job cost Illinois workers more than $420 million
between 1976 and 1984. State and local tax revenues were
negatively impacted as well. The Audit concludes that
manufacturingjobs are the strongest foundation for the long
term economic health of Illinois.
Employing displaced manufacturing workers in high
tech jobs was also examined. Small service businesses are
the fastest growing segment of Illinois' high tech economy.
These are mosdy software producers employing relatively
few people and having relatively low sales. But Illinois has
an impressive number of high tech service businesses, in-
cluding office automation and financial software and
manufacturing and distribution software businesses. This
segment of the high tech economy cannot, however, be
expected to absorb many displaced manufacturing workers,
at least in the short term.
The traditional manufacturing and high tech economics
thus need to be brought closer together for the benefit of
Illinois' economy in the long run. Service businesses and
high technology concerns cannot replace the eroding tradi-
tional manufacturing base. Furthermore, most high tech
development has been limited to the northeastern corner of
the state, and this trend will probably continue.
The Market Intelligence Audit
The Audit evaluated challenges to the Illinois economy
as it approaches 2000 from four perspectives, then assessed
the tradeoffbetween growth in the service and manufactur-
ing sectors. The four parts of theAudit are:
Social and fiscal demographics of Illinois.
Employment gains and losses in Illinois from 1977-80 and 1980-84.
Implications of replacing manufacturing jobs with service jobs.
Implications of moving from a manufacturing economy to an
economy based on high technology.
Social and Fiscal Demographics
Changes in a state's business climate are often closely
related to changes in demographics. During the 1980s,
Illinois has been at the center of important national
demographic trends. Between 1980 and 1986, Illinois'
population grew by only 1.1%, compared to a national
growth rate of6.4%. This tentative growth indicates longer-
With Cooperative Extension Service, College of Agriculture, Urbana-Champaign
term trends. In the year 2000, Illinois' share of the nation's
population will have slipped to 4.2% from 4.8% in 1986.
Illinois' estimated population of 11.2 million in 2000 will
represent a 2% overall decrease from 1986. Such a
decrease will place Illinois 45th among the 50 states in terms
of population growth.
In the years ahead, the maturing of the baby boom
generation will "age" America. In 1980, Illinois was a typical
state in terms of population age. It ranked 21st (along with
California and Ohio) in median age at 29.9 years. In 1985,
11.9% of Illinois' population was 65 or older. This ranked
Illinois 26th in the nation andjust below the national average
of 12.0%. The state's 8.4% increase in older citizens be-
tween 1980 and 1985 was well below the national average of
11.7%.
Perhaps no single factor has a greater influence on a
state's business climate than state government financial
structure and fiscal health. Illinois performs better than
might be expected in terms of state finances and taxes and
performs especially well in terms of total state and local
revenues per $1000 of personal income and per capita state
and local debt outstanding. Illinois, ranked 20th in cor-
porate income taxes as a percentage of state tax collections.
Illinois demographics can be examined in economic
terms as well. Measured through the second quarter, 1986,
Illinois showed a per capita personal income of $15,467.
This figure placed Illinois ninth nationally and first in the
Great Lakes region. But between 1980 and 1986, per capita
income in Illinois rose 46%, good for just 29th place among
the 50 states. Such a slow increase in per capita income is
traceable to the 1982 recession. Job loss from 1980 to 1986
was conspicuous in the manufacturing sector, where ap-
proximately 262,300 jobs were lost. Job growth in Illinois
during this period was robust in terms of number of jobs
added in the service and trade sectors. The picture is less
bright, however, when the percentage growth rate ofjobs in
these sectors is considered. In none of the seven job
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sectors examined in the Audit did Illinois perform better
than 30th in terms of percentage change in employment.
Employment Changes
Part two of the Audit investigated changes in employ-
ment in more than 360 industrial classifications for the
periods 1977-80 and 1980-84, respectively.
The late 1970s were good years for employment expan-
sion in Illinois. Nevertheless, cracks in the Illinois manufac-
turing sector foundation were appearing. This was
particularly true for fabricated metal products, farming and
gardening machinery, and appliance manufacturing.
During the late 1970s, Illinois lost jobs in these areas, while
employment in these sectors continued to grow nationally.
Employment in hospitals, colleges and universities, and
nursing homes in Illinois and nationally showed strong
growth during the late 1970s.
The 1982 recession hit Illinois extremely hard. An in-
spection of employment data reveals 56 employment
categories lost more than 2,000 jobs from 1980 to 1984.
Especially hard hit were manufacturing and construction.
The worst hit manufacturing categories were construction
machinery (24,637 jobs lost) and employment at steel blast
furnaces (19,115 jobs lost). The number of jobs in the
communications equipment and electronic components
sectors decreased in Illinois during the early 1980s, while
these sectors expanded nationally.
A disturbing aspect of the job losses is that Illinois' loss
ofjobs often far exceeded job losses in the same categories
nationally. In Illinois, only 26 employment classifications
expanded by more than 2,000 jobs in the early 1980s. Nearly
half of these were in the service sector, including the com-
puter services sector which added 30,886 jobs.
The Manufacturing-Service Tradeoff
It is often suggested that service jobs can compensate for
Illinois' lost manufacturing jobs. From 1976 through 1984,
service earnings averaged roughly 60% of typical manufac-
turing earnings and increased at a slightly slower rate than
manufacturing earnings.
Earnings and earnings growth disparities are em-
phasized when the total loss in state earning power is as-
sessed. TheAudit estimates that from 1976 to 1984, Illinois
workers lost approximately $420 million in earnings as a
result of shifts in jobs from the manufacturing sector to the
service sector.
Certain regions of the state were more severely affected
than others by this earnings tradeoff. Chicago's collar coun-
ties, for example, were net gainers. Increased service earn-
ings exceeded lost manufacturing earnings in the six collar
counties by approximately $1.28 billion. The downstate
west central region including Peoria and the Quad Cities
experienced a net loss of over $900 million ~ while account-
ing for just 8.9% of the state's manufacturing jobs. Yet, the
$1.1 billion manufacturing earnings loss in this region was
fully 20% of Illinois' total manufacturing earnings loss. In-
deed, the collar counties acted as a life preserver for the
state's economy. Had the six collar counties merelybroken
even, Illinois would have lost more than $1.7 billion in total
earnings.
As of 1984, it is estimated that Illinois was more than
25,000 service jobs short of closing the $420 million
manufacturing-service "earnings gap." This figure, too, dif-
fers by region in the state. The service job gap ranges from
a "do-able" 569 service jobs in the central region of the state
surroundingSpringfield to a gap of72^33 servicejobs in the
Peoria/Quad Cities region.
Illinois' High Technology Profile
The Audit defined the high tech sector to include the
approximately 800 manufacturing, service, and financial
institutions listed in the Corptech High Technology direc-
tory.
The AnJit concludes that high tech business in Illinois is
a regional phenomenon. The overwhelming majority of
high tech establishments in Illinois are located in and
around Chicago. In 1986, downstate claimed only 11.6% of
all high tech businesses (Figure 1).
The Audit found substantial differences in sales and
employment between high tech manufacturing and service
Figure 1: Location of High-Tech
Businesses in Illinois, 1986
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High tech manufacturing businesses are older, employ
more people, and have significantly higher levels of sales
than do their high tech service counterparts. This is a
critically important point, as it is in the service area that the
greatest amount ofhigh tech growth has occurred in the last
20 years (Figure 2). It must be remembered, however, that
Illinois' high tech economy is not based solely on service and
software businesses. The increases in high tech manufac-
turing businesses speaks to the evolution and creation of a
distinct high tech manufacturing base in the state. Indeed,
data suggests that Illinois' high tech economy of the 1990s
will be a diverse and complementary one, capable of giving
concerns.
Founding Date of Illinois
High-Tech Establishments
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Figure 2:
Number of high-tech establishments
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Table 1. Employment and Salea Levels Profiles of High-Tech
Establishments in Illinois, 1966
Sales
1-49 50-499 500+ SO-tSmfl. SS-SSOmiL $50miL +
Percent Percent
Manufacturing 311 53.6 133 39.8 416 18.6
Service 86.8 10.8 14 86.0 1L7 13
Finance, Insurance
and Real Estate 8.4 183 73.2 4.8 l&l 79.0
Source: Corpiech Directory, 1987.
birth to new high tech concerns and working closely and
profitably with the state's existing core businesses.
However, Illinois' current high tech service estab-
lishments are small companies that will not likely absorb
large numbers of workers, at least in the near term. About
87% of these businesses employ fewer than 50 people and
have sales of less than $5 million (Table 1).
Another profile of high tech business is also valuable for
the complimentaryportrait it paints of Illinois' high tech and
traditional economic bases. The Illinois high tech economy
is strong in the areas that have fueled Illinois' economic
growth in the past. These include the electrical and non-
electrical machinery sectors, as well as measurement and
control instruments and alhed chemical products. Further-
more, Illinois' burgeoning high tech business service sector
includes substantial numbers of manufacturing software
producers (36 concerns in 1987, according to the Corptech
Directory), and distribution, software production (55 con-
cerns in 1987), and financial software manufacturers (20
concerns in 1987) and office automation technology (55
concerns in 1987).
Clearly, Illinois' core industries are potentially a great
source of technology users, particularly in productivity en-
hancement areas.
Summary and Policy Implications
The Market IntelligenceAudit presents a challenge to the
Illinois economy. It points out complexities of commonly
proposed solutions to the state's unsettled recent economic
past. It also raises issues that should challenge government
officials, business leaders, and academic researchers. Some
of the difficult issues are:
Which established industries are most important to
Illinois' economic future, to be favored by state economic
development programs?
What state economic development policies should be
adopted to deal with industries that will likely play a less
central role in the state's economic future?
How can state economic development policies help
spread high tech growth beyond Chicagoland?
How can key segments of the state's high tech and tradi-
tional economies be brought closer together to benefit both
sectors and the people of the state generally?
Service business and high technology establishments
cannot replace the potential loss from an eroding, tradition-
al manufacturing base. Furthermore, most high tech
development will likely continue to be limited to the north-
eastern corner of the state. Regional economic develop-
ment policies for downstate economies must emphasize
their comparative advantages.
Author's Credit:
Murray is anAssociate in Strategic PlanningandResearch
at the Chicago Division ofDDB Needhant Worldwide. He
worked on theAudit while a Research Assistant in Institute of
Government and Public Affairs, University ofIllinois.
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Impact Fees: The Critical Issues
Impact fees, or development fees, are typically
one-time charges applied by local governments to
new development. The fees are to help pay for
the infrastructure, such as water and sewer ser-
vices, local roads and drainage, that provides
services for the new activity. Impact fees are
typically set to coincide with problems or added
demands created by development.
Impact fees, unlike general tax receipts, are
intended to benefit the assessed property, as well
as address the external effects of development on
existing property. Strictly speaking, impact fees
are not taxes, but they are an example of the
benefits-received approach to financing govern-
ment. The costs of providing government services
are apportioned according to the benefits re-
ceived. These taxes, charges, or fees represent a
price (albeit an imperfect one) for government
services.
While the concept of impact fees is relatively
straight-forward, their use, including distribution,
their effect on economic development, and their
relation to other sources of revenue, raises impor-
tant issues.
Equity and Distributing Burden. When pro-
perly applied and used efficiently to deal with the
consequences of development, impact fees are an
equitable way to develop infrastructure. Fees
should not redistribute the burden of government
activity from one group to another, or improve
the quality of life for established residents.
Instead, they are intended to provide acceptable
service to new development while offsetting
negative effects of the development on existing
activities. Impact fees should not be used for
exclusionary purposes that reflect preferences of
existing residents for one type of activity over
another (e.g. single family residences vs. apart-
ments, or residential vs. commercial/industrial).
Improperly designed impact fees can distort
development choices, leading to inefficient uses of
land.
Landowners, developers, individuals and firms
purchasing developed property are concerned
about who bears the burden of impact fees. In
large part, the answer depends on how fees are
imposed, how the proceeds are used, and on real
estate market conditions in and around the
jurisdiction. In the most favorable case, there is
no burden. If the fees are assessed in proportion
to the benefits created by infrastructure improve-
ments, and if these improvements generate bene-
fits that exceed their costs, property values rise as
a result of the fee.
The distribution of burden also depends on the
local real estate market. If there are few avail-
able alternative sites in the jurisdiction, and if
With Cooperative Extension Service, College of Agriculture, Urbana-Champaign
buyers are relatively insensitive to price changes,
much of the burden of the imposed fee will be
passed to buyers. Conversely, if there are desir-
able alternative locations without impact fees, and
if buyers respond to price changes, more of the
burden will be borne by the current property
owners.
Impact Fees -
• should be benefit-based
• finance services for new development
• burden of distribution depends on local
market conditions
• can promote development
• should not replace other revenues
Impact Fees and Economic Development. If
impact fees are applied appropriately and pro-
ceeds used judiciously, the fees may promote
development. The benefits of an enhanced infra-
structure can outweigh the cost of the fees,
making the community more attractive to pro-
spective buyers. This is similar to a community
taxing itself to provide needed public services
such as schools and police protection. If fees are
used inappropriately, they will obviously be
viewed as a detriment to potential buyers (as well
as current residents) and will retard development.
Fees used for exclusionary purposes or in an
attempt to shift the general burden of government
activity from established to new residents are
inappropriate uses.
The effect (either positive or negative) of
impact fees on development also depends on the
fee relative to the value of the property. The
effect of impact fees will be modest if the fee
amounts to only a fraction of the yearly property
tax bill.
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If impact fees are used more extensively and
cover a larger portion of infrastructure costs, the
potential for greater effects must be considered.
Since impact fees are most likely to be applied in
rapidly growing areas, the effects are often swam-
ped by the rapid growth, making it very difficult
to discern any negative influence.
The Relationship of Impact Fees to Other
Revenue Sources. Impact fees should not sub-
stitute for other sources of infrastructure financ-
ing. Local governments should not divert non-
impact fee revenues away from areas or activities
generating impact fees. For example, it would be
unfair to impose impact fees to build roads in a
new area, then impose a uniform district-wide
property tax rate and use the proceeds to build
roads in older areas.
The approach typically preferred to address this
problem is to reduce impact fees to take into ac-
count a portion of future taxes generated from
the development and to give credit for infrastruc-
ture provided in-kind (either voluntarily or throu-
gh exactions) by developers. As an alternative,
future taxes could be abated to account for these
factors.
Similarly, state government should not alter
investment decisions because of locally imposed
impact fees. In such a situation, impact fees
would replace external sources of support, which
is clearly undesirable for a local government.
State and Local Governments
The search for alternative infrastructure fi-
nancing techniques has accelerated over the last
decade. However, the effective use of impact fees
places a substantial administrative burden on local
governments. If impact fees are to be widely
used, the state needs to establish general parame-
ters for their use, while allowing local govern-
ments to respond to unique situations.
While any impact fee "package" should be
tailored to meet local circumstances, the experi-
ence of states can lend valuable insight to the
uses and limits of impact fee ordinances, collec-
tions and disbursements. California and Florida
are noteworthy examples of states with impact fee
experiences, though these fees are becoming more
popular in other states as well.
Illinois recently passed state legislation
regulating the use of impact fees by local
governments for transportation.
Impact Fee Enabling Acts. Some impact fees
are initiated under general powers available to
local governments, while others are expressly
permitted and controlled by state governments.
States granting authority to impose impact fees
need to develop legal and judicial guidelines
concerning their use, collection and distribution.
State guidelines would provide a framework for
local governments to develop their ordinances.
Such guidelines should specify the limitations and
responsibilities of local government authority,
while providing the development industry a basis
on which to judge the fees being imposed. Such
legislation would also provide courts with needed
criteria on which to review legal objections to the
ordinance. Currently, there is wide variation in
the specificity of impact fee legislation, presenting
local governments, developers and state courts
with issues for which there is little guidance.
Impact fees have been available to home rule
communities in California since the 1960s. The
California act allows communities to impose
development fees on a development's "significant
environmental impacts" which include the socio-
economic and fiscal environments. Since 1981,
the legislation also requires communities to
prepare schedules of the fees based on projections
of future capital needs, determination of costs,
and equitable distribution of costs.
Contributing development must benefit from
the fee it pays. However, legal guidance stops
there. Courts require that impact fees need only
be "reasonably related" to the contributing devel-
opment's impact on community facilities and that
there need not be a direct relationship between
the development and the exaction if the exaction
is necessary to maintain general welfare.
Florida is commonly held to have the most
rigid judicial and legislative guidelines regarding
the use and implementation of impact fees. Prior
to 1975, Florida courts held that various forms of
impact fees were unauthorized methods of taxa-
tion, because they did not always bear specific
relation to their use. However, the courts now
authorize impact fees for water and sewer.
A Florida court case marked the birth of the
rational nexus test under which impact fees must:
(1) bear a close and identifiable relationship to
the development, (2) be expended within specific
geographic boundaries and (3) not exceed the cost
of expanding infrastructure or services beyond the
added burden placed upon it by new development.
In other words, impact fees could not be used to
finance existing deficiencies, but are used to
maintain the "pre-development" level of service
within the determined boundaries affected by the
development. Note that the effects of develop-
ment on water and sewer needs is easier to
attribute to particular users than are transporta-
tion effects.
While Florida's rational nexus test is commonly
viewed as the most comprehensive of all state
guidelines, states embrace differing opinions about
the role of new development in financing public
facilities.
Most jurisdictions, however, are required by
statute or court ruling to attempt to (1) relate
impact fees to the added burdens specific devel-
opments impose on infrastructure and services,
(2) state explicitly the purposes for which the
revenue will be used, (3) maintain separate ac-
counts for impact fees, and (4) invest fees in a
manner consistent with the ordinance.
Government's Role -
• heavy local administrative role
• state needs to set parameters
• credits and waivers must be used to avoid
double charging
• should not fund general improvements
Setting Impact Fees. Although a wide variety
of approaches to calculate impact fees can be
used, several features are common. First, before
any fee is calculated, the jurisdiction must define
a service level to be maintained. If pre-develop-
ment levels are below the goals set by local
planners, investments must be made to obtain the
desired level before fees are imposed. Second,
estimates of service demand must be established
for each land use. Finally, the capacity of the
infrastructure per unit of investment must also be
established, as well as the associated
construction/maintenance costs.
Granting Credits and Waivers. Perhaps the
most complex aspect of impact fees is local
governments' granting credits and fee waivers to
new developments. Credits and waivers reduce
fees. They are one way to address the double
charging problem that results if occupants of a
new development pay taxes and other fees nor-
mally used for the same purposes as the fee. The
reasoning is as follows: each new development
becomes part of the community, and as such pays
property taxes, utility charges and other local fees
used to finance local infrastructure.
If the new development pays taxes, charges and
fees in full, and part of the receipts are used to
maintain facilities and retire existing debt, then
the new development is effectively paying twice
for facilities ~ once through the impact fee and
once through property taxes, charges and fees.
For example, gasoline taxes are often used to
maintain city and state roads. Because new
residents buy gas locally, gasoline tax collections
will increase. This money is used to pay for road
improvements - some of which residents of the
new development have already paid for through
their impact fee.
The impact fee should, therefore, credit de-
velopment with the probable increase in a portion
of the gasoline tax revenue from new residents.
A similar argument holds for dedicated portions
of property taxes.
In addition, many developers build access roads
and dedicate open space. This situation consti-
tutes payment in kind, and is frequently credited
against the development fee.
Summary and Conclusions
Impact fees are a potentially important source
of new funding for local governments to finance
infrastructure construction necessitated by new
development. Impact fees attempt to place some
of the burden for new construction on the activi-
ties that generate the need for additional capacity,
but their use must be weighed against alternative
revenue sources available for similar purposes.
Impact fees can be used in an effective, pro-
development manner. Fees should reflect the
service demands development creates and the
proceeds should be used to build capacity to deal
with these demands. Impact fees should not
replace other general revenue sources available to
all locations (new and old) and appropriate credit
or discounts should be provided to account for
taxes paid or for in-kind contributions by develop-
ers that increase capacity.
Local governments must implement, administer
and monitor impact fees with fairness and effi-
ciency. To accomplish this, states should guide
local governments in applying impact fees, while
allowing local flexibility to respond to unique
situations. If impact fees are properly assessed
and efficiently used, any negative effect on devel-
opment can be minimized, if not eliminated.
Harrison S. Campbell, Jr. is a Ph.D. student in the
Department of Geography, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, and a research assistant in
the Institute of Government and Public Affairs.
/. Fred Giertz is a professor in the Department of
Economics and Institute of Government and
Public Affairs at the University of Illinois.
Policy Forum
institute of Government and Public Affairs
University of Illinois
1201 West Nevada Street
Urbana, IL 61801
The University of Illinois is an affirmative action/equal opportunity institution
P758
3:2 1990 COPY 3
i—njxs.
Institute ui uu«ci IMIICMl
« « »ss?y
COMMUNICATIONS
Policy Forum The Library ui
tns
SEP U 1990
University of i'.itnols
U n i ve r s^ g.fonPfoaMifcilfl i s
Volume 3, Number 2, 1990
EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN ILLINOIS
John B. Crihfield
Education is sometimes perceived as a panacea
for economic development. Indeed, an earlier
issue of Policy Forum takes this view, and argues
for increased public educational expenditures in
small rural communities as an economic develop-
ment strategy. This linkage between public
spending on education and the performance of
the economy warrants closer inspection. In this
issue, data are reviewed, and a policy framework
for providing primary and secondary education in
the state is considered.
Employment and Education in Illinois
Employment growth and unemployment rates
are handy, if not always unambiguous, measures
of economic performance. Average county non-
farm employment in Illinois declined by about 3%
from 1980 to 1985 (County Business Patterns, 1980
and 1985). However, employment growth varied
widely around the state. Employment in the
Chicago area grew by almost 14% over this
period, while southern Illinois counties had
employment growth of about 2%. Employment
declined in northern and central Illinois counties.
Average employment decline was somewhat higher
in rural counties than in urban counties (-3.6%
compared to -1.5%).
Most employment gains were concentrated in
Chicago and St. Louis area counties. Within the
northern and central counties, declines were
evenly felt in urban and rural areas, with 8%
declines in the northern counties and 6% declines
in central counties.
Rough measures of educational attainment are
provided by high school and college completion
rates for persons 25 years old or older. In 1980
(the most recent year for which data are avail-
able), roughly 67% of such persons in Illinois had
completed high school, while 16% had completed
college. Both measures are highest in the Chica-
go counties, and lowest in the southern counties.
Comparing rural to urban areas, high school
completion rates were lower, on average, in rural
counties (60% compared to 69%), and college
completion rates were lower, on average, in rural
counties (9% compared to 15%).
Between 1980 and 1986, primary and secondary
public school enrollment declined throughout
Illinois. The average county experienced a de-
cline of about 12.5% over this period. Declines
varied between 9% and 15% around the state, but
were the highest, on average, in the rural counties
(-13.6% compared to -9.0% in urban counties).
For primary and secondary public schools, the
county average per-pupil expenditure in Illinois
(1982 dollars) was $2,571. (1982 is the most
recent year available in the 1988 County and City
Data Book, and is suitable for purposes in this
publication.)
Expenditures were highest in Chicago counties
($2,946) and lowest in central Illinois counties
($2,517), but the difference is only 17%. Surpris-
ingly, rural per-pupil expenditures exceeded those
in urban counties ($2,613 versus $2,446).
With Cooperative Extension Service, College of Agriculture, Urbana-Champaign
In the 1986-87 school year, rural counties pro-
vided less support per pupil from local revenue
sources than did urban counties ($1,609 versus
$1,825), and received more state and federal
support per pupil than did urban counties ($1,325
versus $1,159). Indeed, rural students in South-
ern Illinois received more state and federal
support per pupil than did any other region in
the state. (See Illinois State Board of Education,
Illinois Public Schools Financial Statistics 1986-87
School Year. These figures are expressed in 1982
dollars. Although these data show similar pat-
terns as data in the 1988 County and City Data
Book, they are not directly comparable because
they include revenue for retirement benefits and
interest payments.)
These data provide an overview of general
conditions in education and the state economy, by
location and rural status. To illustrate relation-
ships among these variables using the Illinois
data, one can use correlation analysis to identify
statistically important relationships between
employment, educational attainment, and invest-
ment in schooling.
Consider the relevance of metropolitan (or
rural) status. There is a significant positive
correlation between unemployment and rural
status, although there is no significant relation-
ship between employment growth and rural status.
There are also significant negative correlations
between rural status and high school and college
completion rates. The positive association be-
tween school expenditures per pupil and rural
status is also significant, as is the correlation
between state and federal financial support per
pupil and rural status. The public spending bias
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favoring rural counties is due to the state, as
opposed to federal, component of spending.
There are other interesting relationships as well.
High school and college completion rates are not
significantly correlated with per-pupil expendi-
tures. Nor are they significantly correlated with
employment growth. Similarly, per-pupil expendi-
tures are not significantly correlated with employ-
ment growth or county unemployment rates.
Spending and Student Performance
The ability to improve student performance by
increasing public support to primary and second-
ary schools is often assumed. Consequently, it
may come as a surprise that a preponderance of
research finds very little correlation between
expenditures per pupil and student performance,
consistent with the results just described for
Illinois. Hanushek compiled two of the most
comprehensive surveys of this literature to date.
[Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling:
Production and Efficiency in Public Schools,"
Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXIV, (Sep-
tember 1986): 1141-1177, and Throwing Money
at Schools," Journal of Policy Analysis and Man-
agement Vol. 1 (1981): 19-41.] His findings
should be sobering to anyone inclined to throw
additional money at public schools.
In 49 of 65 studies (i.e., 75%) expenditures per
pupil were not systematically related to student
performance. In 89 of 112 studies (79%), teach-
er/pupil ratios were not systematically related to
performance. In 95 of 109 studies (89%) teacher
education was not systematically related to per-
formance, and in 50 of 60 studies (83%) teacher
salary was not systematically related to perform-
ance. Despite the different approaches used in
these studies, the consistent theme regarding the
effect of additional expenditures leads Hanushek
to conclude, There appears to be no strong
systematic relationship between school expendi-
tures and student performance," and "expenditure
parameters are unrelated to student performance
after family backgrounds and other educational
inputs are considered."
Education and Economic Development
Now consider public education in the larger
context of economic development. The issue of
economic growth as related to education turns on
efficiency considerations. Efficiency means getting
the most from educational resources, given equity
and political considerations. One efficiency
argument is grounded in the theory of "public
goods." That is, education bestows benefits on
more than just students. It benefits other persons
wholly separate from the private gains to the
students receiving education. At least up to a
point, an economy will be stronger to the extent
that it uses public resources to invest in educa-
tional infrastructure.
Unfortunately, little is known about the magni-
tude of this effect, and whether it applies more to
primary or to secondary schools. Nor can it be
said that these so-called externalities are more
important for rural than for urban schools, or
vice-versa.
Another efficiency argument concerns the
organizational structure of schools, the incentives
facing decision-makers, and the educational
choices available to students and parents. Schools
that waste resources are a drag on local and state
economies. It is noteworthy that both total
expenditures per student and instructional expen-
ditures per student in the United States have
risen substantially in real terms since 1960, while
average class size has dropped. However, over
the same period, there has been little overall
improvement in student performance. In other
words, since 1960 the cost of education has risen
substantially without commensurate improvement
in school quality. There may be a number of
reasons for this. Much has changed since 1960;
for example, the student mix and the quality of
teachers have changed in 25 years.
At the same time, an important reason for
rising costs may be the greater influence of
teachers' unions in contract negotiations, and the
lack of incentives for school administrators and
school boards to contain costs. Parents have
been ineffectual in stemming these higher costs,
and an important reason may be that they have
had limited options in choosing schools. In short,
supplier incentives appear to explain public school
inefficiencies.
Policy Implications
These issues have several policy implications
for questions pertaining to economic development
and school spending and other public education
issues in Illinois.
First, using public schools as explicit instru-
ments in attracting or retaining employers or
employees in economic development strategies
misdirects educational policy. The business of the
schools is in educating students, not in luring
business or enticing employees. Many factors
affect location decisions, and it is not clear what
effect schools have on them. An efficient and
equitable policy in education would allow each
pupil an acceptable level of financial support,
while seeking a cost effective way to provide
educational services. In general, such a policy is
not place specific and does not have a meaningful
urban-rural dimension.
Second, with the substantial growth in real
expenditures per pupil since 1960, and given the
pro-expenditure supplier incentives built into the
current structure of public schooling, it seems
unlikely that there is systematic underinvestment
in education in either rural or urban areas in
terms of the public goods argument.
Third, although there are large differences in
the extremes in expenditures per pupil across the
972 school districts in Illinois, there is much less
variation across most school districts. The cur-
rent spending range of from 32,100 per pupil to
Si 1,000 per pupil is often pointed out as evi-
dence.
But contrary to popular impression, per-pupil
averages for DuPage and Cook Counties are not
much above the statewide county average (11%
and 21%, respectively). In fact, from data in the
1988 County and City Data Book, per-pupil expen-
ditures are highest in rural Pulaski County in
Southern Illinois ($4,6% in 1982 dollars), and
lowest in urban Sangamon County ($1,888). As
mentioned, the average for all rural counties
exceeds the average for urban counties ($2,613
compared to $2,446), and state and federal trans-
fers per pupil are greater for rural counties than
for urban counties ($1,325 compared to $1,159).
In short, unless there have been dramatic recent
shifts, rural counties do not appear to be "de-
prived" relative to their urban counterparts in
terms of educational spending.
Increased state expenditures for education to
close spending disparities would disproportionate-
ly favor urban counties in Central and Southern
Illinois, and the teachers and administrators in
these school districts. However "equitable" such
transfers might be, it is unlikely that such spend-
ing would improve the achievement level of
students in these school districts.
Finally, most primary and secondary education
in Illinois is publicly funded and publicly pro-
vided. Although parents choose where to live,
and thereby choose a school district, they have
little choice in school selection once their resi-
dence is determined. Such arrangements give
local public schools monopolies in their respective
school districts. Allowing parents greater choice
in school selection could increase the accountabil-
ity and efficiency of all public schools.
Correspondingly, a more efficient system of
primary and secondary schools-public and pri-
vate-translates into more productive economies in
both rural and urban areas.
Summary
Everyone has a stake in how well public
schools perform and how they are funded.
Evidence indicates that additional spending on
public schools in Illinois is not likely to improve
student performance or cause economic growth.
At the same time, existing educational resources
could be better organized to the advantage of
students and economy alike.
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PROPERTY TAX RELIEF MECHANISMS: *^
SHOULD STATES GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS?t% ^
Therese J. McGuire
2 4 n
Setting the Stage
During the 1980s state governments became
increasingly involved in setting domestic policy in the
U.S. One reason for the increased state involvement
in domestic issues was that during this period the
federal government simultaneously decreased real
federal aid to state and local governments and
loosened the reins on state governments, through
changes in regulations and grant formulas.
The changes in fiscal responsibility and the
difficulties encountered in many areas of social policy
turned the 1980s into a decade of great uncertainty
and turmoil for state budgets and state revenue flows.
Many states set up special state tax studies or
commissions to advise policymakers on the best fiscal
options available. The goal was to reform the state
fiscal system, but in each case it soon became apparent
that the strong fiscal link between state and local
governments could not be ignored. Through grants-
in-aid mandates, regulations, and restrictions, state
governments are heavily involved in the fiscal affairs of
local governments.
Thus, to evaluate a state fiscal system, it is necessary
to evaluate local fiscal systems and the link between
the two. A large component of the fiscal link between
state and local governments is property tax relief
mechanisms. In what follows, these mechanisms are
evaluated from an economist's perspective. While
political arguments for state involvement in local
property taxes are easy to come by, this article
concludes that it is difficult to justify many forms of
state provided property tax relief using economic
principles.
A Broad Definition of Property Tax Relief
Mechanisms
The traditional forms of property tax relief include
homestead exemptions and credits, circuit breakers,
classification of property types, and tax deferral
programs. In defining property tax relief, I want both
to broaden the scope-to any state action that could
result in lower local property taxes-and to sharpen
the focus~to consider only property tax relief that
involves state not local choices and actions. So, for
example, state aid to local governments and state-
granted authority to impose local sales taxes are forms
of property tax relief under this definition, whereas a
decision by a local government to lower its property
tax rate is not included in the definition, because it is
a local rather than a state decision.
Under this broad definition at least nine basic forms
of property tax relief can be identified. Most states
engage in many of the forms of relief described below.
Illinois is no exception.
Homestead exemptions and credits. Under a
homestead exemption, a certain amount of the value
of the property of homeowners is exempt from
taxation. An exemption removes property value from
the tax rolls. It does not result in state reimbursement
of local governments. It does result in a redistribution
of total property taxes away from owner-occupied
residential property to other types of property, in
particular, to commercial and industrial property.
Because the exemption is usually for a flat amount, the
exemption is of greater value to individuals with homes
of relatively low market value-that is, to lower income
individuals.
With Cooperative Extension Service, College of Agriculture, Urbana-Champaign
A homestead credit involves state assumption of a
portion of the taxpayer's liability. For example, a state
might provide a credit of 40 percent of the
homeowner's property tax bill. Thus, under a credit,
the state reimburses the local unit of government in
the amount of the credit and the taxpayer is
responsible for the remaining portion (60 percent in
this example) of the tax bill.
Circuit breakers. Circuit breakers are often
implemented through the personal income tax as
refundable income tax credits. The credits are targeted
to low income individuals and often to elderly home-
owners and renters. The rationale for including
renters is that landlords are able to pass at least a
portion of property taxes on to renters through higher
rents. The amount of the credit for property taxes
paid falls as the taxpayer's income rises.
Classification. Through different assessment ratios
or different nominal millage rates, different types of
property are subject to different effective tax rates.
The classification systems in many states were
implemented in recognition of de facto classification
that had resulted through the assessment process.
Many states assess owner occupied residential
properties and farm land at lower ratios than other
types of property. Like the homestead exemption,
classification does not result in lower overall property
taxes, but instead the property tax burden is
redistributed away from favored types of property and
towards other types of property.
Property tax limitation measures. State
governments have imposed limits or constraints on
property tax rates, property tax assessment increases,
property tax revenues, and local government spending.
Whether state-imposed limitation measures are costly
to the state government depends on how the state
reacts to the changed fiscal circumstances of the local
governments.
State shared revenues and state aid. State aid and
state shared revenues provide local governments with
an alternative source of revenue to the local property
tax. State aid is obviously costly to the state, but it
does not necessarily result in lower local property
taxes.
State-granted authority to impose non-property
taxes. Like state aid, local non-property taxes provide
local governments with a viable alternative to the
property tax, thereby giving local governments the
financial means to lower property taxes if they so
desire. These state actions are not costly to the state
government. However, a complete evaluation of this
policy would involve questions of tax overlap and
appropriate tax assignment.
State assumption of local spending responsibilities.
In recent years, many states have assumed
responsibility for health care, welfare, public justice,
and other services previously provided by local
governments. This shift in responsibility is costly to
the state and enables local units of government to
reduce property taxes if so desired.
Tax deferral. Under tax deferral programs, certain
types of taxpayers are allowed to defer their tax
liabilities to a specified time in the future. Deferral
programs do not reduce taxes. Instead, the taxpayer
can use these programs to accomplish a better match
between income flows and tax payments.
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State income tax deduction for local property taxes
paid. Many states allow state income taxpayers a
deduction for local property taxes paid. Net property
taxes are thus lower for the taxpayers who take the
deduction. Because many states have graduated
personal income tax rates and because higher income
individuals are more likely to take the deduction, this
form of property tax relief is of greater value to higher
income taxpayers.
These types of property tax relief differ from one
another in many important ways. Some of the
mechanisms are costly to the state, others are not.
Some automatically result in lower property tax
burdens for certain taxpayers, others only provide a
potential means for reducing tax burdens. Some
simply redistribute a given total property tax burden
among types of property. What are the economic
justifications and implications of the various
mechanisms? The next section attempts to answer this
question.
An Economic Evaluation of Property Tax
Relief Mechanisms
An economic evaluation of the policies included in
a broad definition of state property tax relief
mechanisms involves two questions:
(1) Why should states be involved in local property tax
relief? In other words, what are the economic
justifications for such actions?
(2) How effective are property tax relief mechanisms?
Or, what are the economic effects?
To answer the first question, it is useful to review
the two basic models of government behavior that
economists rely on to explain and evaluate government
decisions. The median voter model assumes that the
decisions made by elected officials reflect the wishes- of
the resident-voters, or at least of the median or swing
resident-voter. According to this model, the chosen
levels of government expenditures and taxes are the
desired levels of expenditures and taxes. If this model
is a close approximation to the true behavior of local
governments, there would appear to be no need for
state involvement in local fiscal decisions.
The implications of the second model of
government behavior are quite different. The budget-
maximizing bureaucratic model of government behavior
assumes that elected officials are primarily interested
in their own well-being and that the bigger their
budgets the happier they are. If local governments are
better described by this model, the expectation is that
the levels of local expenditures and taxes will be higher
than the levels desired by the resident-voters. In this
case, limits or controls on the fiscal behavior of local
bureaucrats may be justified.
Which model is more appropriate for local
governments? The answer is not clear. On the one
hand, it is often argued that local governments are
more responsive to the desires of voters than are
other, higher levels of government; that competition
among local governments provides a natural restraint
on undesirable spending; and that information on
public expenditures and services is better at the local
level enabling voters to make better decisions that
restrain elected officials. On the other hand, the
evidence on the effect of state grants on local
government spending decisions indicates that local
elected officials may spend more than is desired by the
resident-voters (the so-called flypaper effect).
It is likely that there is a little bit of both models
at play. The goal of this inquiry is to try to explain
or justify state involvement in local fiscal affairs. The
real question is, then, are local governments more or
less likely than state governments to be held in check
by voters? Or, are state or local governments in
greater need of outside controls or limits on fiscal
behavior? Based on the ideas aforementioned, a
plausible case could be made that the excessive-
spending culprit is more likely to be state government
than local government.
When states engage in the various forms of property
tax relief, the property tax can lose its ability to be the
major source of local revenue. To be fiscally
responsible-to be accountable for local fiscal
decisions-local governments need a viable source of
revenue over which they have substantial control. The
two main competitors to the local property tax are
local general sales taxes and local income taxes. Both
of these taxes are as problematic as local taxes. When
all the pros and cons of the various alternatives are
weighed, the property tax stands up to scrutiny. In
other words, when states get involved heavily in
property tax relief and limitations on the use of
property taxes, they cripple one of the more viable
means of fiscal empowerment for local governments.
Thus, there would appear to be little economic
justification for state involvement in local fiscal affairs
generally, and for certain property tax relief
mechanisms specifically. To complete the economic
evaluation of property tax relief mechanisms, the
second question posed above must be answered. What
are the economic effects of property tax relief
mechanisms?
An examination of five of the nine mechanisms
described above provides a taste of the myriad of likely
effects. Homestead credits that are designed so that
the state picks up a significant share of the
homeowner's property tax bill act like matching state
aid. In effect, if the credit is, say, 40 percent, each
extra dollar of local property tax costs the taxpayer
only 60 cents. The taxpayer gets an increase in local
expenditures (and presumably local services) of one
dollar at a price of only 60 cents. This type of
"matching aid" tends to stimulate local spending and
breaks the link between marginal benefit and marginal
cost to the taxpayer. This type of property tax relief
is likely to lead to inefficiently high levels of local
spending (and, paradoxically, can lead to higher rather
than lower property taxes if the stimulation effect is
strong enough).
Circuit breakers tend to be good mechanisms for
providing targeted relief. As long as the set of
taxpayers who qualify for the credit is small, the
potential inefficiencies associated with the program-
trie same inefficiencies identified with homestead
credits-are also likely to be small. As a corollary,
circuit breakers are not an appropriate tool for general
property tax relief.
The economic effects of state aid to local
governments were mentioned above. The empirical
evidence confirms that the "fly-paper effect" (the idea
that grant money sticks where it hits) exists and may
be large, suggesting that state aid tends to end up as
increases in local spending rather than as decreases in
local property taxes.
Classification of property results in a redistribution
of the overall burden rather than a reduction in the
overall tax burden. Many classification systems
redistribute the burden away from owner-occupied
residential property, where resident-voters tend to live,
and toward commercial and industrial property, where
non-residents tend to work. An argument is
sometimes made that classification results in local
officials setting higher property taxes than they would
choose if all the property owners were resident-voters
in the local jurisdiction. This source of inefficiency is
a potential concern whenever governments rely on
taxes that are exported to nonresidents (who do not
have voting rights in the jurisdiction imposing the tax).
The final form of property tax relief mechanism to
be evaluated here is property tax limitation measures .
The effectiveness of these measures depends very much
on the specific design of the measure. For example,
those limitations that apply only to property tax rates
tend not to be effective at limiting property taxes
because the property tax base (the assessed value) is
unconstrained. Property tax limitations can be the
source of inefficient spending and taxing behavior as
local elected officials choose second and third best
policies in an effort to circumvent the limits.
Summary
Property tax relief mechanisms are just one part of
a large mosaic called the state and local fiscal system.
From this systemic viewpoint, the most important
question to ask is, Do the costs of state provision of
local property tax relief outweigh the benefits? As
stale spending pressures and tax burdens increase, the
answer to this question is likely to be in the
affirmative for many states.
There thus appears to be no magic solution to high
property tax burdens. Each of the property tax relief
mechanisms has its imperfections. The very concept of
state involvement in the fiscal affairs of local
governments is challenged, here, through an
interpretation of economic models and evidence. As
states continue to evaluate and reform their fiscal
systems in the decade to come, the link between state
and local governments provided by property tax relief
mechanisms will be an important area of potential
reform and change.
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FOR DOWNTOWN CHICAGO: A DISCUSSION&&m
n>
BASIC ISSUES «ssSSm»*«"
John F. McDonald
Transportation infrastructure has always played a
critical part in Chicago's economic vitality. Chicago's
transportation innovations-from the Illinois and
Michigan Canal to O'Hare Airport-have capitalized
on the metropolitan area's location for over 150 years.
However, one aspect of the transportation system has
been neglected since the 1890s, when the famous Loop
elevated line was constructed. The movement of
people within the downtown area has become an
increasingly important problem.
During the past decade downtown Chicago has
expanded both upward and outward. The downtown
area contains some 44% of all employment located in
the city of Chicago, and over half of the employment
growth in the city since the recession of 1981-82 is
located downtown. As of 1989, total private
employment in downtown Chicago was 522,000.
Federal, state, and local government employment is
also concentrated in the downtown area. This makes
downtown Chicago the largest concentration of
employment in the nation outside of Manhattan. The
Metropolitan Planning Council (MPC) has proposed
that a more efficient downtown system include a
network of light-rail transit lines. The city of Chicago
is now conducting formal evaluations of the light-rail
transit proposal and other suggested transportation
improvements for the downtown area.
Chicago's Downtown Transportation Problem
Chicago's downtown may be defined as extending from
Michigan Avenue and Oak Street on the north, to
McCormick Place on the south, to Lake Michigan on
the east, and to the Ryan and Kennedy expressways
on the west. This area is about 5 miles from north to
south and over 1 1/2 miles from east to west. The
Metropolitan Planning Council notes that about
850,000 people enter the central area on an average
weekday, and about one million trips are made within
the downtown area on a typical weekday. Traffic is
projected to increase some 30 percent by the year
2010. Some major businesses have resorted to private
shuttle buses to transport their workers because of the
shortage of mass transit and the difficulty CTA buses
have moving through traffic. The growth of the
downtown area has also included a substantial increase
in the number of households residing within the area.
Clearly there is a need for a transportation system that
connects commuter stations, parking facilities, and
CTA transit stations and bus lines with offices,
shopping areas, cultural centers, hotels, and convention
facilities. What is more, there is a need to connect
offices with shopping areas, office areas with other
office areas, hotels with cultural centers, and all of the
other possible combinations. Indeed, one of the
primary reasons for the economic growth of the
downtown area is the relative ease with which face-
to-face contacts can be made with an amazingly diverse
set of customers, clients, suppliers, government
agencies, etc. Downtown Chicago is one of the world's
centers for these kinds of "urbanization economies."
Proposed Solutions
A report prepared by Barton-Aschman Associates for
the city of Chicago has defined five broad alternatives.
With Cooperative Extension Service, College of Agriculture, Urbana-Champaign
Null Alternative. The null alternative is required by
the U. S. Department of Transportation's evaluation
procedures, and serves as a baseline against which
other policy options are compared. It includes two
major improvements—the Southwest Transit Line and
the Howard-Dan Ryan rapid transit lines connection
south of 14th Street.
Transportation Systems Management Alternative. This
alternative involves some sizable operational and
physical improvements in the bus system service. New
bus stations would be added, new vehicles would be
acquired, a better communications system would be
added, and some routes would be changed. In
addition, several steps would be taken to improve the
management of traffic in the downtown area. The cost
of this alternative is estimated at under $100 million.
Bus-Build Alternative. The objective of the bus-build
alternative is to create a bus system that is nearly
separate from general traffic by means of both at-
grade and below-grade bus facilities. Studies indicate
that this option provides very limited benefits at
substantial cost, and will therefore receive no further
consideration.
Light-Rail Transit Alternative. This alternative
involves a new type of transit system that makes use of
railway tracks embedded in the roadway. The vehicles
are powered by electricity. Various options have been
suggested to serve four corridors of high demand.
1. East-West (Loop), beginning west of the Chicago
River and running east across the Loop to
Columbus Drive. Monroe Street is the leading
candidate for the light-rail transit route.
2. Riverbank, running on a north-south route to the
west of the Chicago River (along Canal and/or
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Clinton Streets). It would turn east in the vicinity
of Kinzie Street (400 North) and run to Navy Pier
on an alignment just north of the Chicago River.
3. North Michigan/Streeterville, east and west along
Chicago Avenue from State Street to a point near
Lake Shore Drive, and then to a point south of
the Chicago River. The north-south portion of
the line would most likely be located on Columbus
Drive and Fairbanks Court.
4. South Lakefront connecting a point near Monroe
Street and Michigan Avenue with points perhaps
as far south as McCormick Place.
Three other light-rail transit alternatives are also under
consideration. These options involve the development
of a system that omits some or all of the light-rail
transit facility in one of the four corridors listed above
(except for the East-West (Loop) corridor). Each
light-rail transit proposal includes a supporting bus
system.
Grade-Separated Alternative. This approach involves
making use of existing railroad rights-of-way that exist
below street level and constructing new elevated transit
facilities. A grade-separated system could be
implemented by extending rapid transit and commuter
rail lines and/or by creating a new mode called
automated guideway technology. Preliminary
investigations indicate that this alternative is neither
physically nor economically feasible.
Benefits of the Proposed Projects
The real benefits of the alternatives proposed include
time saved, reductions in fuel consumption and wear
and tear on other vehicles, and environmental
improvements. The most important category of
benefits is time saved. The following calculations are
taken partially from a consultant's report and illustrate
benefits from time savings.
Consider first the transportation systems management
alternative compared to the null alternative. Average
rush-hour speeds on six different downtown shuttle bus
lines have been estimated for these two alternatives.
Average speed is estimated to increase by 1 mile per
hour on five of the six bus lines and by 2 miles per
hour on the sixth. This means that a trip of 1 1/2
miles that requires 15 minutes (6 mph) under the null
alternative would require 12.8 minutes under the
transportation systems management alternative. This
is a saving of less than three minutes. Consider the
impact if improvements saved 4 minutes per day (one
trip in each direction) for 100,000 people: with 250
work days per year, that means 1000 minutes per year
per person, or 16.67 hours. The total time saved by
100,000 people would then be 1.67 million hours.
Empirical studies typically find that the value for time
saved on the trip itself (as opposed to waiting time)
usually averages about 33% of the person's wage rate.
The average employee in the city of Chicago earned
$24,600 in 1987, which translates into an hourly wage
of $12.30. If that average person is in the 15% tax
bracket (plus 3% for the Illinois income tax), the after
tax wage was $10.12 per hour. This suggests that the
value of time saved might be about $3.34 per hour.
Therefore, if 100,000 people save a total of 1.67
million hours of time, they have saved time worth
about $5.58 million dollars per year! As can be seen
from the illustrative calculation, the total value of ..the
savings depends critically on the number of people
who benefit.
The estimates provided by consultants indicate that,
compared to the null alternative, passengers on the
light-rail transit system will travel at speeds
approximately 3 mph greater than they would on the
bus. This translates into a saving of about six minutes
for a trip of 1 1/2 miles, or 50 hours per year per
person (for two trips per day). The MPC cites an
estimated daily ridership of 72,000 (or 36,000 persons)
on the Monroe and Riverbank lines of the light-rail
transit system. If the value of time is $3.34 per hour,
these 36,000 people save time that is worth about $6
million per year.
The final evaluation of the two alternatives must
include a complete accounting of benefits, and whether
the benefits, measured in dollars, are at all
commensurate with the costs of the projects. Let us
now consider those costs.
Cost and Financing of the Proposed Projects
The cost of the transportation systems management
alternative is estimated to be less than $100 million,
and the construction cost of the light-rail transit
system is about $600 million. Apparently no detailed
plans have been formulated for financing the
transportation systems management alternative, while
the issue of financing the light-rail transit system has
been examined in considerable depth. Clearly much of
the discussion regarding financing of the light-rail
transit system is relevant for the transportation systems
management alternative as well.
The MPC report recommends that the capital cost of
the light-rail transit system be shared equally among
the federal government, the state of Illinois, and
"downtown interests." Everyone seems to have adopted
this cost-sharing formula as a working assumption. Up
until 1989 the Urban Mass Transit Administration of
the U. S. Department of Transportation provided 75%
of the design and construction costs of new rail
projects. Since 1989 priority has been given to
projects requiring less than 50% funding from the
federal government. Some priority is also given to
projects financed partly by funds from the private
sector.
The working assumption is that 1/3 of the capital cost
of the light-rail transit system would be provided by
the U. S. Urban Mass Transit Administration, 1/3 by
the state of Illinois through bonds specifically for this
purpose, and 1/3 by local revenues.
The MPC recommended, and in February 1991 the
Chicago City Council approved, the creation of a
special local property tax district (or Special Service
Area) that includes non-residential properties located
within 1/4 to 1/2 mile of the light-rail transit system.
One-third of the capital costs would be paid over a
period of years by an additional item on the property
tax bills of downtown properties. The MPC estimates
that the added revenue required to cover capital costs
would be $18 million per year, which is an estimated
increase in tax bills for downtown non-residential
properties of about 2%. It is not clear why residential
properties are excluded from this added tax. This
question also leads to a more general issue.
Transportation improvements for a relatively small
area such as a downtown district, if executed well, will
generate increases in the value of nearby real estate.
Indeed, one method for estimating the benefits of the
project is to estimate this increase in real estate values.
Note that this is an alternative method for arriving at
an estimate of benefits. The value of time saved and
other direct benefits cannot be added to the increase
in real estate values. This would result in double
counting. Real estate values increase because people
save time, fuel, etc. The change in the market value
of real estate should roughly reflect the real benefits
of the transportation improvement.
The corresponding increase in the assessed value of
downtown real estate will generate additional property
tax revenue without a change in tax rates, provided the
project actually generates the expected benefits. For
example, assume that the proposed light-rail transit
system actually generates benefits equal to $600 million
and that downtown commercial real estate pays
property taxes approximately equal to 3.5% of market
value. If the market value of downtown properties
increases by $600 million, then the existing property
tax system will generate an additional $21 million per
year. This additional revenue would be enough to
cover the local 1/3 share of the capital costs of the
project. Therefore, strictly speaking, the enactment of
a special taxing district is not necessary unless the
benefits of the proposed project do not materialize.
Other sources of funding have been suggested for the
local share of the capital costs, including tax increment
financing districts and transportation-related taxes such
as a tax on downtown parking. But, given that the
proposed light rail transit system is supposed to
enhance downtown real estate values, a property tax
financing system would impose the costs of the system
on those benefiting from improved transportation -
downtown property owners.
The operating deficit is the other component of the
cost of the light-rail transit system that must be
covered by local revenue sources. One strategy is to
use a parking tax as the primary source of revenue,
and to supplement that with increased traffic fines or
increased property taxes from a special downtown
property tax district if necessary.
A parking tax is attractive because it would raise the
price of downtown auto trips and thus discourage the
use of the private auto. Some marginal decrease in
traffic congestion would result, and the ridership on
public transit would increase. This recommendation
appears to be consistent with the city's stated policy
(as of January 1989) that more off-street parking
facilities should be placed in the outer core of the
Loop, and that transit is still the preferred mode for
trips to downtown. However, the design of a parking
tax as a major source of revenue to finance the
operating deficit should be done in conjunction with
the development of a comprehensive policy regarding
downtown parking facilities. Higher fines for traffic
and parking violations, especially in the downtown
area, may have merit. But it is not clear whether this
can be a major source of revenue.
The debate on finding an appropriate revenue source
to subsidize the operations of a light-rail system is just
beginning. It should be noted that, presuming the
light-rail transit system generates the benefits
proponents anticipate, sufficient added property tax
revenue can be available from downtown properties to
cover both 1/3 of the capital cost and the operating
deficit. Use of the additional property tax revenues for
this purpose would require that the various local
governmental entities not view the revenue associated
with the increase in assessed value as a windfall.
Obviously, a mechanism must be designed to make
sure that the additional property tax revenues reach
the light-rail transit system.
John F. McDonald is Professor of Economics, University
of Illinois at Chicago and a faculty affiliate of IGPA.
The author thanks David Chicoine, Fred Giertz and
Anna Merritt for helpful comments on an earlier version
of this article.
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FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE:
A SOCIAL ASSURANCE POLICY
Christine E. Lidbury and Noreen M. Sugrue
Family and medical leave policy has become a major
social issue of the 1990s. Business groups, labor
unions, and organizations concerned with the elderly,
as well women's groups and child welfare advocates
have identified family and medical leave policy as a
priority in lobbying efforts and labor-management
negotiations.
Family and medical leave policy ensures that people
who must temporarily leave the labor force can do so
without jeopardizing either their jobs or long-term
economic security. While specific aspects of family
and medical leave legislation vary, most state initiatives
provide that half-time and full-time employees can take
a specified amount of time off work, without pay, in
order to care for a family member, or because they
themselves have a non-work related illness or injury
that prohibits them from working for a limited time.
Three Views
Discussions concerning the federal and state role in
family and medical leave policy posit two alternative
perspectives: Such a policy simply establishes a
minimum labor standard or it mandates employee
benefits. A third approach is to view family and
medical leave policy as neither a mandated benefit nor
a minimum labor standard, but as a social assurance
policy.
A Minimum Labor Standard. A minimum labor
standard is set so that employees will be protected
while on the job. These standards are designed to
minimize work place morbidity and mortality, as well
as to guard against the exploitation of employees.
Examples of minimum labor standards include the
eight-hour work day, minimum wage guarantees,
adequate safety programs, and proper heating,
ventilation, and lighting.
An Employee Benefit. Employee benefits, in contrast,
are perks that enhance quality of life and are given to
employees at minimal or no cost to them. In effect,
they are a part of the cost of labor. The quantity and
quality of benefits are part of a package that employers
use to attract workers and to compensate them for
their work. Vacation time, health insurance, sick time,
tuition reimbursement, or loan programs are examples
of employee benefits.
A Social Assurance Policy. Social assurance policies,
and the programs developed out of those policies, are
part of the basic social fabric of industrialized society.
For example, government establishes policies to
guarantee that people in need are cared for and that
both employers and employees make adjustments and
economic sacrifices to pay the costs associated with
those policies. Examples of such policies include job
protection while an individual is on jury duty or is
called to active duty in the armed forces, as well as
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the 1990
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). These social
assurance policies are designed to address situations
that arise out of structural conditions and needs.
While some social assurance policies are in reality
entitlement policies, not all social assurance policies
are entitlements. SSI is both a social assurance and
entitlement policy. It guarantees that, regardless of
financial need, adults of all ages, who are unable to
care for themselves due to a physical and/or emotional
disability, have access to a minimum level of income.
With Cooperative Extension Service, College of Agriculture, Urbana-Champaign
SSI is funded through mandated employer and
employee social security payments.
Job protected leaves for jury duty and active armed
forces duty are social assurance policies but not
entitlements. These policies provide that employees
will be given unpaid leaves of absences and will be
given comparable jobs upon their return. Such leaves
are provided because policy makers have decreed that
their absences exist due to a societal interest that must
be met, and that the benefits of unpaid employee
leaves outweigh the costs. Therefore, employers and
employees are required to bear the costs associated
with such absences from the work place.
Employees who take time off under family and medical
leave provisions are making an economic sacrifice: they
are forfeiting wages, and often health benefits, for a
specified period of time. Employers, too, carry an
economic burden when employees use family and
medical leave provisions. Employers must continue to
run a company, and the absence of an employee for an
extended period of time requires that temporary
workers be brought in, other employees take on
additional responsibilities, and/or some workers be
paid overtime.
The costs of social assurance policies, be they
entitlements or not, are shared among people and/or
organizations who only indirectly benefit from the
provisions of those policies. As a social assurance
policy, family and medical leave involves costs to
employees (e.g., lost wages) and employers (e.g.,
replacement workers), but it is designed so that people
in need of care (e.g., children, the elderly, and the ill)
can receive it.
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Is a Family and Medical Leave Policy
Needed?
Family and medical leave policies have attracted
widespread attention because of changing social
demographics and composition of the labor force. A
large body of literature documents these changes as
well as the profound impact that these changes are
having on familial caregiving to children and the
elderly. Historically people have relied on family
members least likely to be in the labor force, primarily
women, to meet the social needs associated with
caregiving services. A result of the changing
demographics and labor force composition has been
that family members most likely to be relied on for
caregiving services are no longer readily available.
These changes have not been accompanied by
corresponding decreases in familial caregiving needs.
Approximately 23 states, plus the District of Columbia,
have enacted some form of job protected family and/or
medical leave. At the national level, as well as in the
other states (including Illinois), arguments about the
value, viability and need for family and medical leave
policies continue. Since most mandated policies in
this arena are relatively new, few comprehensive
studies have been conducted on the costs associated
with having versus not having such policies. It should
be noted that no state has enacted a family and
medical leave policy and then rescinded it. In fact,
some states (e.g., Minnesota and Rhode Island) are
examining the possibility of enlarging the scope of
their current policies.
Proponents of mandated family and medical leave
policy contend that while employees as well as
employers have costs associated with family and
medical leave, there also are benefits to both.
Research has shown that policies which allow
employees to take time from work in order to attend
to family responsibilities ensure that family members
in need of care receive it. When the needs of all
family members are attended to, destabilizing or crisis
situations are less likely to occur.
Official testimony by some corporate executives
supports the notion that providing temporary leave to
employees greatly enhances the long-term stability of
their work force. In addition, the assurance that
experienced and trained workers will not permanently
leave a company because of a short-term personal
crisis means that new personnel will not have to be
hired and trained. One corporate executive noted that
the costs associated with recruiting, hiring, and training
even one new employee was more than the cost of a
family and medical leave policy. In an attempt to
quantify the cost to employers of family and medical
leave policy, a 1989 study by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) estimates, even with
employers providing health insurance to workers on
family or medical leave, the annual cost per eligible
employee would not exceed $5.30.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and employers who
oppose mandated family and medical leave policy, do
not challenge the need for family and medical leave
provisions. It is their contention, however, that
current demographic shifts will cause companies to
establish their own policies. Further, they oppose any
governmental intervention mandating family and
medical leave policy. In 1986 Catalyst, Inc. and the
Bureau of National Affairs reported that because of
pressure to retain skilled employees more companies
are now offering maternity and child care leaves. In
addition, a majority of Fortune 500 companies already
provide some form of family and medical leave.
Proponents point out, however, that these initiatives
cover less than 29 percent of employees nationwide.
In addition, many of these policies provide leave only
to pregnant women.
A major point of contention between proponents and
opponents of mandated family and medical leave policy
has been concern over its economic costs and who
should bear them. The GAO study estimated a
minimal net cost adjustment due to employees being
on temporary family and medical leaves. They found
that employers replaced less than one in three absent
workers. Furthermore, the cost of temporary workers
is similar to or less than the cost of replaced workers.
The primary cost of a family and medical leave policy
stems from employers continuing their contributions
to employee health insurance benefits. However, most
family and medical leave initiatives do not mandate
continuation of health benefits at an employer's
expense.
Illinois: An Example. A family and medical leave bill
was passed by the Illinois General Assembly during
both the 1989 and 1990 legislative sessions. Both bills
were vetoed. In his veto message, then-Governor
Thompson stated that such legislation would mandate
benefits and that this would be an inappropriate
government action. The 1990 Illinois bill provided:
- up to eight weeks of leave over a 24-month period
for birth or adoption of a child or serious illness
of a child, parent or spouse;
- up to eight weeks of leave over a 24-month
period for personal medical leave for a serious,
non-work related illness or injury;
- that employers with 50 or fewer employees be
exempt and only employees who have been
employed for one year and work 20 or more
hours per week be eligible;
- that leaves be unpaid and employers not be
required to continue health insurance benefits
during leave periods.
Illinois, employing more than 60,000 workers, currently
offers a generous family and medical leave plan to
state employees. It provides for:
- family leave, up to one year, for the care of a
newborn infant (including adoption); care of a
sick member of the employee's household or
family; special care of a resident of the employee's
household in extraordinary need; response to a
temporary dislocation due to a natural disaster
including crime; and settling the estate of a
deceased family member;
- disability leave, for sickness or injury, including
pregnancy related disability, for an unspecified
length of time based upon need and prognosis, to
be verified every 30 days;
- child care leave, up to a total of six months, for
situations where the employee's care of a child is
required to avoid unusual disturbances in the
child's life.
In addition, the state has a family and child care leave
policy, which was implemented in May 1984. Use of
its provisions has been very low. During the period
1985-1988 the percent of state employees taking family
and medical leave (i.e., medical, adoption and child
care leaves) was less than one-half of one percent.
The actual number of employees taking family and
medical leave for any year ranged from 156 to 248 out
of a pool of approximately 60,000 eligible employees.
Concern over the potential cost of additional
unemployment insurance claims on employers using
temporary workers to replace employees on leave has
been an argument against a legislatively mandated
family and medical leave policy for this state. Under
Illinois law, workers hired for more than 30 days are
eligible for unemployment benefits. If the number of
workers filing unemployment claims against a company
increases, the cost of the company's unemployment
insurance also increases. Opponents to mandated
family and medical leave contend that this places an
undue economic burden on companies.
Proponents argue that under Illinois law employers are
already required to pay unemployment benefits to
employees that are denied their jobs upon returning
from family or medical leaves. Consequently, they
contend, if a family and medical leave policy were
enacted there would be no net increase in the number
of employees seeking unemployment insurance benefits
or in the total cost to employers.
Two Illinois employers have instituted family and
medical leave programs similar in design to those
proposed in the Illinois legislature. Robert O'Keefe,
Vice-President of Human Resources for Fel-Pro, a
manufacturing company employing 2000 workers in
Skokie, reports that, like the State of Illinois, less than
one-half of one percent of its entire payroll is on leave
at any given time. Fel-Pro has never received an
unemployment insurance claim from a temporary
worker who had been hired to replace an employee on
family or medical leave.
Mr. O'Keefe has found that there are many creative
and cost-effective approaches to maintaining high
levels of productivity when employees are on leave.
Fel-Pro, for example, uses employee leaves as an
opportunity to create a more knowledgeable,
promotable, and stable work force by cross-training
employees not on leave.
SYSTAT, Inc., a statistical software corporation in
Evanston employing approximately 50 workers, has a
family and medical leave policy based on the text of
the original Illinois proposal. Leland Wilkinson,
president of the company, notes that since the policy
was implemented in January 1988, only one employee
has used the program.
According to Mr. Wilkinson, the cost of providing the
policy for his company equals the cost of paying for
the employee's health insurance during the leave, the
cost of hiring and training temporary replacements for
the clerical employees, and using consultants for
programming and technical assistance.
CONCLUSION
Viewing family and medical leave policy as a social
assurance policy assumes a societal interest in
providing job protection so that employees who must
attend to the needs of ill or injured family members,
or to their own non-work related illness or injury, can
responsibly do so without losing their jobs.
The question, however, still remains whether family
and medical leave policy should be legislated or left to
the market place. Proponents of mandated family and
medical leave argue that society has an overriding
interest in ensuring that people's jobs are protected
while they meet certain social and familial obligations.
Opponents of the legislative route argue that meeting
such familial obligations is the responsibility of
individuals and that society has only minimal interest
in protecting the jobs of those meeting such
obligations.
Ms. Lidbury is a graduate research assistant at IGPA
and an M.P^A. student in public administration at the
University of Illinois at Chicago. Ms. Sugrue is a visiting
lecturer at IGPA and a Ph.D. student in the School of
Public Health at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
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RACE, SEX, AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT IN CHICAGO
Cedric Herring
During the 1980s, the U.S. economy produced the
longest peacetime expansion in the post-World War II
period. Employment increased by nearly 20 million
jobs. In 1989 unemployment reached its lowest level
in 15 years. But it is one thing to have a job and
quite another to have employment that adequately
meets one's basic economic needs and sufficiently
utilizes one's abilities and capabilities. Indeed, for 5
million working Americans, having a job is small
consolation. They are still impoverished. In fact,
almost half of all adults living in poverty are employed.
Relying on the unemployment rate as the basic means
of assessing the status of the labor force misses the
plight of these workers. A more extensive indicator of
underemployment would show that, despite more jobs
and lower unemployment rates, labor market prospects
for many American workers have fundamentally
deteriorated.
Perhaps ironically, as the labor force participation
rates of women and racial minorities have increased,
more attention has been focused on the tendencies for
these groups to be impoverished. In part, this can be
explained by the fact that most jobs created during the
1980s that these groups held were characterized by
wages insufficient to lift a family of four out of
poverty, less than full-time work, or skill
under-utilization. Yet, little is known about
underemployment since the government does not
report such data. Nevertheless, there is growing
consensus that underemployment will be a major
policy issue of the 1990s.
Like other ailments in society, there is reason to
suppose that the incidence of underemployment varies
across sociodemographic groups. In this issue of
Policy Forum, differences in the distribution of the four
types of underemployment by race and by sex are
underscored. Using survey data from the Illinois Poll,
the focus will be on identifying the broad contours of
underemployment among African-American, other
non-white, and white residents of Chicago.
Defining Underemployment
There are four types of underemployment: (1)
joblessness, (2) involuntary part-time employment, (3)
low income (poverty wage) status, and (4) occupational
mismatch or overeducation. These relate to the three
most important dimensions of underemployment: time,
income, and use of workers' skills.
Joblessness is a type of underemployment in which
would-be workers have not acquired initial access to
the labor market or have quit, been laid off, fired, or
dismissed. Unlike the U.S. government's concept of
unemployment, in which a person must still be actively
seeking employment in order to be enumerated, this
category includes those without jobs who have become
discouraged to the point of having given up searching
for employment. This category does not, however,
include those out of the labor force who would not or
could not take a job if one were offered.
Involuntary part-time employment is a type of
underemployment in which would-be full-time,
year-round workers have their hours of employment
limited by their employers. These workers are
underemployed in the sense that they would prefer to
be employed on a full-time basis, or because they have
only temporary or seasonal employment. This category
does not include those workers who are in the labor
market on a part-time basis due to their preference for
working less than full-time.
With Cooperative Extension Service, College of Agriculture, Urbana-Champaign
Low income (poverty wage) status is a type of
underemployment which exists when workers with
full-time, year-round employment do not receive wages
sufficient to raise their personal incomes to 1.25 times
the poverty threshold for individuals as defined by the
U.S. Social Security Administration. Family income
(rather than personal income) is used in this analysis
because of data limitations. This provides a very
conservative estimate of the proportion of people in
this category.
Occupational mismatch (overeducation) is a type of
underemployment which exists when workers who have
no other forms of underemployment experience gross
under-utilization of their skills in fulfilling their
current job duties. To tap this, respondents were
asked "do you feel you have the skills and abilities for
a better job than the one you have now?" When
workers felt they had skills and abilities that should
qualify them for better jobs and they received incomes
that were more than two standard deviations below the
average for people with their level of education, they
were considered occupationally mismatched or
overeducated. This dimension incorporates workers
who receive incomes substantially less than others with
similar credentials.
Statistical analyses have shown that the types of
underemployment can be hierarchically ordered into
mutually exclusive categories that are ranked in terms
of "severity" from joblessness through occupational
mismatch: (1) joblessness, (2) involuntary part-time,
(3) poverty wage status, and (4) occupational
mismatch. Joblessness, which involves no work time,
no utilization of work-related skills, and no income
from work activities, is the most severe type of
underemployment. Involuntary part-time status, the
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second most severe type of underemployment, involves
fewer work hours than desired. This in turn limits the
degree to which work skills can be parlayed into higher
income. Poverty wage work, despite full-time
employment, still does not provide income sufficient
for workers to lift themselves out of poverty.
Occupational mismatch is the least severe type of
underemployment. It includes those workers who feel
they have skills for better jobs and, despite receiving
incomes above the poverty line, still receive incomes
substantially lower than others with comparable levels
of education. The analysis presented below also
includes as a comparison those respondents whose
skills and talents were adequately utilized (i.e., not
underemployed).
Race, Sex, and Underemployment:
A Look at Some Patterns
The data used in the analysis were collected by the
University of Illinois' Institute of Government and
Public Affairs, and the following units at the
University of Illinois at Chicago: the Department of
Political Science, the Office of Social Science
Research, and the Public Policy Analysis Program.
The data were collected in an October 1990 random
digit-dialing telephone survey of 1015 adults in Illinois.
The population, therefore, is the adult population of
Illinois. The margin of error for the entire survey is
between two and three percent. The focus here,
however, is on the subsample of 275 adult residents of
Chicago. Thus, the margin of error of concern is
approximately six percent.
One in five (20%) Chicago adults was jobless at the
time of the survey. This compares with official
estimates of the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate
of 5.7% for October 1990. This discrepancy points
out the limitations of the official definition of
unemployment which specifies as unemployed only
"those civilians who, during the survey week, had no
employment but were available for work and (1) had
engaged in specific job-seeking activity within the past
4 weeks; (2) were waiting to be called back to a job
from which they had been laid off; or (3) were waiting
to report to a new wage or salary job within 30 days."
The government definition of unemployment renders
invisible those jobless people who were so discouraged
by their poor prospects for work that they had
abandoned the search (and thus were not among those
officially unemployed) and those "seasonal" workers for
whom the survey week fell in an "off season." The
government definition classifies these would-be workers
as "not in the labor force."
In addition to the jobless, another ten percent of
Chicago adults who were not employed on a full-time
basis were working fewer hours than they would have
liked. Moreover, the conservative estimate of those
working full-time, year-round for poverty wages shows
that more than one out of 15 (7%) Chicago adults was
among the working poor. About one out of twenty
(5%) of Chicago adults were occupationally
mismatched. Thus, less than six out of ten (58%)
Chicagoans had adequate employment.
Racial differences in how the various types of
underemployment were apportioned in Chicago were
also evident. African-Americans and other non-whites
were more likely than whites to be jobless. In
addition, African-Americans and other non-whites were
less likely than whites to be able to secure full-time
work. They were also more likely to be among the
ranks of the working poor. Whites, however, were
more likely than African-Americans and other
non-whites to be occupationally mismatched, and they
were more likely to experience adequate skill
utilization. Generally, whites were less vulnerable to
the more severe forms of underemployment than were
African-Americans and other non-whites.
The "feminization of poverty" is a concept that
underscores the linkages between poverty and women's
disadvantage in the labor market. In Chicago women
were about twice as likely as men to be among the
working poor (9% versus 4.5%). Men were, however,
more likely than women to be jobless (21% versus
18%). Men were also more likely than women to be
involuntary part-time workers or occupationally
mismatched. Women were more likely than men to
report adequate skill utilization.
Turning to the distribution of employment status by
race and sex, the data show that about 30% of
African-American men and 22% of African-American
women were jobless. This compares with 17% and
14% of white men and women respectively. Twenty
percent of both men and women from other racial
groups were jobless. For African-Americans and
whites, men and women were about equally likely to
be involuntary part-timers. For other racial groups,
however, men were more likely than women to work
fewer hours than they desired.
The data also present different race-sex patterns in the
distribution of poverty-wage workers. For whites, men
were more likely than women to be among the
working poor. For African-Americans and other
non-whites, women were more likely than men to be
among the working poor.
Occupational mismatch was more characteristic of
African-American men than African-American women.
This type of underemployment was also more typical
of white men than white women. Among other racial
groups, however, there were no occupationally
mismatched workers of either sex in the sample.
The data also illustrate vastly different tendencies
for the race-sex groups in their abilities to utilize their
skills adequately. Only 45% of African-American men
were able to engage their skills and talents in the
labor market satisfactorily; half of African-American
women were able to do so. About six in ten white
men (58%) amply utilized their skills, while more than
two thirds of white women (68%) were able to apply
their talents sufficiently. While half the men from
other racial groups had adequate skill utilization, about
two thirds (65%) of women from these racial groups
had adequate skill utilization.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Government statistics do not provide information
on the prevalence of underemployment. While results
from this analysis are necessarily provisional, they
suggest that the levels of underemployment are
substantially higher than the levels of unemployment
reported by government sources. They also suggest
that the more severe forms of underemployment are
concentrated among African-Americans and other
non-whites. Moreover, poverty-wage underemployment
is about twice as common for women as for men.
The problem of underemployment provides some
formidable challenges to policy-makers concerned with
reducing the waste of human capabilities. The
challenges are great in that policies such as job
training, while more politically popular than programs
that involve direct government intervention in the
hiring and promotion practices of employers, do not
appear to address several forms of this problem. Many
would-be workers already feel they have skills that
surpass what is required by their current employers.
While this type of occupational mismatch may result
from worker's overestimation of their abilities, such
self-assessments cast some doubt on the widespread
assumption that employment problems stem strictly
from an under-skilled work force.
Occupational mismatch may also result from market-
driven "skill obsolescence" when industries die out,
factories and plants shut down, or technology displaces
workers. In such cases, legislation that provides for
advance notice of layoffs and additional funding for
worker-retraining would be useful.
But occupational mismatch is the least severe form of
underemployment. Far more problematic for most
underemployed workers is the utter scarcity of jobs,
especially positions that pay wages sufficient to raise
incomes above the poverty threshold. Ultimately,
policies must be designed that encourage employers to
make use of the skills and talents that American
workers bring to the labor market. This will, by
definition, mean that there must be more jobs that
provide more work hours and wages above the
minimum. This may also mean the development of
policies that discourage employers from relocating to
foreign lands.
Other difficulties of underemployment concern the
tendency for African-Americans and other non-whites
to suffer from the most severe forms. While this
analysis cannot determine the degree to which these
differences are attributable to discriminatory practices
in the labor market, anti-discrimination and affirmative
action policies need to be enforced to reduce the
inequities in who bears the brunt of underemployment.
Similarly, among female householders with no spouse
present, 40% of those living in poverty had jobs but
were underemployed. A new key to understanding the
sources of poverty, therefore, might be underemploy-
ment among women. Accordingly, policies aimed at
improving the status of women need to include steps
to reduce women's levels of poverty-wage
underemployment. A step in that direction would
bethe institution of pay equity programs that reward
women in a fashion similar to men for jobs that have
similar skill requirements and economic worth to
employers. Indeed, research has shown that if working
women were paid what similarly qualified men earn,
the number of poor families would decrease by half.
Results reported here also raise questions about the
adequacy of using unemployment rates as social
indicators. There is a need to go beyond merely
focusing on the percentage of people searching for
jobs of any kind. At a minimum, there need to be
indicators that tell how many of those defined officially
as "not in the labor force" are in fact would-be
workers. Also, with the growth of a service sector that
typically offers employment that is less financially
rewarding and less secure, there should also be
concern about the quality of jobs and what they
indicate about America's international competitiveness,
business profits, capital investments, and individual and
family economic welfare. It is also important to be
able to tell who suffers from the various forms of skill
under-utilization, as the prevalence, scope, and effects
of underemployment will continue to be important
issues. The current official method of measuring
unemployment fails to address these crucial issues.
Cedric Herring is an associate professor in the Institute
of Government and Public Affairs and in the Department
of Sociology at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
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LAND-USE DECISIONS IN RURAL AREAS:
PITTING OLD KING COAL AGAINST CORN
John B. Crihfield and Harrison S. Campbell, Jr.
In many states, when large-scale changes in land use
are proposed, state agencies become involved in
evaluating the relative merits of alternative uses for
land. Depending on the proposal, departments of
energy, natural resources, mines, minerals,
transportation and other state agencies must study the
area in terms of the environmental, geologic, social
and economic impacts of different land uses. While
these reports are often lengthy, requiring many man-
hours of public service, they do not always address
important economic aspects of the land's most
productive use to society.
In Illinois, when the proposal involves converting farm
land to mining, the Department of Mines and Minerals
steps in to prepare a comprehensive evaluation of the
site. While these reports are both broad in scope and
detailed, they fail to address the normative question:
What should be done with the land under
consideration? An analysis of land-use alternatives
must seek to determine the socially optimal allocation
of land between competing uses.
This essay reviews a recent land-use tussle in west
central Illinois, the implications of which spill well
beyond the borders of a rural township, and question
the appropriateness of the evaluation processes used by
the state to direct land-use decisions. We argue and
illustrate that a simple economic net present value
calculation employing readily available data under
several sets of assumptions can and should be
incorporated into such an evaluation to provide
additional guidance in land-use decision making.
Issues in Rural Land Use
A fracas has erupted over some quiet pasture land in
west central Illinois. Beneath the fertile Ipava, Tama,
and Sable soils-some of the most fertile in the world
-lie rich seams of bituminous coal. Not all
landowners share a desire to cultivate crops or raise
livestock; some would rather sell their land to mining
companies interested in exploiting the underlying
mineral. The Illinois Department of Mines and
Minerals has joined the fray and must decide how the
land can be used.
Many farmers are quick to defend the original soils
from strip miners' shovels. Illinois state law lends
assistance by permitting interested parties to petition
the state to designate lands as unsuitable for coal
mining. Whatever its merits, this petition process
takes many months, requires the preparation of long
reports at taxpayers' expense, and delays the allocation
of land to alternative uses. If one's objective is
efficient land use, lengthy review is often unnecessary.
Barring market failure, competitive markets put land
to its most productive use, and calculations derived
from an optimal land-use model suggest this has, in
fact, occurred in west central Illinois. Indeed, the
social loss from interfering with the market can be
quite high, and in rural counties the present value of
this loss can equal or even surpass the value of a
year's output from a county.
When there is a dispute over land-use, the state
government prepares a land report. This report
mentions practically everything that might be affected
by a new coal mine. (See Illinois Department of
Energy and Natural Resources, Illinois Land Reports,
Salem Township of Knox County (Springfield, 111.: May
1990), hereafter referred to as the Report.) Among
other things, the Report describes how a mine could
affect aquifers, water quality, air quality, soil quality
and productivity, wildlife, ancient burial grounds,
employment, income, and property tax assessments.
With Cooperative Extension Service, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
But despite this seemingly exhaustive compendium of
possible impacts, the Report does not address the
fundamental question: What is the most productive
use of the contested land in the township? No
calculation is made to condense the myriad effects into
a meaningful comparison. Is the land more valuable
in agriculture, or is it more valuable in coal
production, with a return of the land to agriculture
after several decades? This may seem like an
impossible comparison-except that markets make such
implicit comparisons countless times every day
throughout the economy. Real estate markets typically
allocate land to its most productive use. Those willing
to pay the most for a particular site bid at least as
much for that site as those having the next-best use for
the land. This explains why warehouses are not
located in financial districts. It could happen, of
course, but the owner of the site could lose a small
fortune in foregone rents from the gentlemen in
pinstripes and top hats.
We illustrate the use of an optimal land-use
calculation using Knox County, a rural area fifty miles
northwest of Peoria. Although there are no operating
mines in the county, a coal company has been
purchasing land in Salem Township with the intent to
strip mine a total of about 30 million tons of coal over
a period of twenty to fifty years. Local protest has led
to extensive investigation by state agencies of impacts
of coal mining in the county. Although the Illinois
Department of Mines and Minerals has ruled to deny
the farmers' petition, local groups have asked for an
appeal. Whatever the final outcome, the issues raised
in this case are general and will arise in future land-
use disputes.
Comparing Alternative Uses of Rural Land
Land values are driven by land productivity. In rural
areas these values often hinge on profits in agriculture.
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In Knox County they are also affected by potential
profits in coal mining, assuming that mining is allowed.
One can estimate the value of the contested land in
these competing uses. These calculations are
approximations, but they offer order-of-magnitude
estimates for alternative land uses. Not all influences
on the net value of alternative activities can be
included. In particular, externalities-for example, the
costs of water pollution caused by mining or farming
-are omitted, since measures are unavailable for such
costs in the contested area. However, it would be
possible to include these costs in the future if their
magnitudes became available.
Value of land in agriculture. To measure the value of
land in agriculture, we use grain prices and costs for
central Illinois, and yield and acreage data for Knox
County. Three scenarios are considered. An "average
scenario" is characterized by average values in recent
years for grain prices, production costs, crop yields,
and grazing values, and calculations are made for low
estimates of affected land (using coal company figures),
high estimates of affected land (using Illinois State
Geological Survey figures), and an average of the two.
Also considered are two extreme scenarios: scenario
A represents assumptions for a bumper crop (high
yields and low prices in 1986), and scenario B
represents assumptions for drought (low yields and
high prices in 1988). Over many years, however, these
extremes balance out, so that the "average" is the most
reasonable scenario, although results for all three are
shown in Table 1. Based on the average scenario, the
annual value of the contested land in agriculture
TABLE 1. VALUE OF LAND IN AGRICULTURE (1969 DOLLARS)
Average Scenario Scenario A Scenario B
Annual net value of
affected land
Low acreage
(3122 acres of crops,
1121 acres of pasture)
272,790 -308,896 104,513
Average acreage
(3301 acres of crops,
1463 acres of pasture)
295,590 -334,714 113,249
High acreage
(3479 acres of crops,
1805 acres of pasture)
318,312 -360,444 121,954
Net present value of
affected land
Low acreage 9,093,000 -10,296,533 3,463,767
Average acreage 9,853,000 -11,157,133 3.774,967
High acreage 10,610,400 -12,014,800 4,065,133
Notes: For further discussion see John B Crihfield, "Corn and King Coal: Land Use
Issues In Rural Areas,' University of Illinois, Department of Agricultural Economics Staff
Paper #90 E-453, August 1990
ranges from $273,000 to $318,000 (1989 dollars), and
the net present value of this land ranges from $9
million to $10.6 million. These calculations are not
very sensitive to the assumption regarding the amount
of affected land. However, yield and price assumptions
are important. Scenarios A and B indicate lower
valuations than the average scenario due to low prices
in A and low yields in B. The negative valuations in
A do not necessarily imply losses to farmers since
calculations use market prices and exclude subsidies,
which represent transfers from taxpayers to farmers.
Value of land in coal mining. The contested area
harbors between 29 million and 33 million tons of
marketable coal. Depending on the mine's annual
output, which could range from roughly 600,000 to
1,100,000 tons per year (based on nearby mines), the
life of the mine could range from 27 to 52 years.
Production costs for the U.S. and Illinois . include
labor, capital, and materials.
Three scenarios are examined for coal mining, which
are defined by amount of marketable coal and the
annual rate of coal production. For each scenario
three sets of market prices and costs are considered:
"low" represents the lowest real price of coal between
1977 and 1986, combined with average U.S. costs
increased to reflect the somewhat higher Illinois costs;
"high" represents the highest price of coal over this
period, combined with average U.S. production costs;
and "average" represents the average price and cost
over the period. It turns out that mine depletion
assumptions do not make much difference in the
calculations (Table 2); however, price and cost
assumptions are crucial. The most likely estimates are
those using average price and cost, and imply that the
value of the mine plus reclaimed land ranges from
$13.2 million to $16.7 million. However, unexpected
shocks to fuel markets could yield substantially
different results. An energy crunch that saw coal
prices rise to $42 per ton would cause a tenfold
increase in the net present value of the coal, from
$13.6 million to $138 million (excluding reclaimed
land). In light of the Persian Gulf War and other
disputes in major oil producing regions of the world,
this scenario may become increasingly likely in coming
years, particularly if energy policy directives promote
domestic energy sources.
Land-Use Valuation and Public Policy
These calculations are meant to reflect as closely as
possible market valuations for the dominant land uses
in the contested area in Salem Township. Using long-
run average values for prices, costs, and productivities,
the mine-cum-reclaimed land is worth $15.4 million,
while the land in agriculture alone is worth $9.9
million. Based on these estimates, banning the mine
would lead to a social loss to the state and national
economies of over $5 million. With increasing fuel
scarcity, the loss could be much higher. Under
unfavorable conditions, both farming and mining
generate negative net values.
TABLE 2. NET PRESENT VALUE OF LAND IN COAL MINING (19W DoUara)
Profit (loss)
per ton:
Scenario A Scenario B Average Scenario
Average
Coal
Ag
12,127,383
1,140,400
14,358,056
2,387,744
13,811,444
1,830,007
TOTAL 13,287,793 18,745,800 15,441,451*
Low
"Coal
Ag
-167,956,088
1,140,400
-198,849,245
2,387,744
188,509,174
1,830,007
TOTAL -188,815,888 -198,461,501 -188,879,187
High
Coai
Ag
123,267,475
1,140,400
145,940,791
2,387,744
138,351,938
1,830,007
TOTAL 124,407,875 148,328,535 140,181,943
Notes: 'Ag* refers to the net present value of land returned to agriculture after the mine
closes. These calculations assume that the agricultural productivity of reclaimed land
is 46 percent less than the original soil. Scenario A assumes that there are 33 million
tons of marketable coal, and that mine output per year equals .83 million tons. Scenario
B assumes that there are 29 million tons of marketable coal, and that mine output
equals 1 .07 million tons per year. The 'average1 scenario uses the means of values In
Scenarios A and B.
There is, of course, uncertainty in these estimates. No
one really knows whether another energy "crisis" will
burst on the scene, nor can one predict with much
accuracy future grain prices. Recent history is replete
with price surprises. Real coal prices more than
doubled from 1970 to 1978, although in 1986 they
were 35 percent less than their 1978 peak. Even more
dramatic, in 1986 corn prices were 63 percent off their
1980 high. No government agency or commodity
market analyst can make flawless forecasts. On the
other hand, by their nature markets digest relevant
information in assessing relative values, and
entrepreneurs risking large investments have full
incentive to accurately assess prices, costs, and risks.
They may not get it right, but no one else has greater
incentive to do so.
A land-use model designed to explain outcomes in
rural areas works reasonably well in explaining
outcomes as illustrated for Knox County. It predicts
that farming would be the most productive land use in
Salem Township in the 1980s. This is, in fact, how
markets allocated land during the decade. In the
1980s the number of mines in the 3-county area
(Fulton, Knox, and Peoria counties) fell from 6 to 1,
and mining employment fell dramatically from 71 to
79. The model also predicts the current interest in
coal mining, under the assumption that there will be
increasing scarcity of energy resources. Left to itself,
the land market appears to allocate land to its most
productive use. Why, then, does the government
intervene? We suspect two possibilities:
1) The presence of market failure. Both farming
and mining can lead to serious externality costs from
air and water pollution. It is telling, however, that the
government's Report makes no attempt to measure
these costs. It is not even apparent whether mining
creates higher externality costs than farming.
2) Land-use laws are written to favor farming
interests. Farmers in Knox County have been unable
or unwilling to outbid coal speculators. However,
Illinois law allows a few individuals to delay or even to
block certain forms of land use. What can not be
obtained in the marketplace might be attained through
government regulation. In particular, in Knox County
two individuals and the Knox County Farm Bureau
filed the petition. It is perfectly legitimate, of course,
for individuals and corporations to use laws to their
advantage. However, there are social costs to this
regulation:
- Resources used by government to conduct
environmental and economic impact studies. In this
case, 33 state employees (scientists and other
professionals) coauthored the Report prepared by
the Illinois Department of Energy and Natural
Resources. These relatively high-paid professionals
could have been used in more productive endeavors,
as opposed to compiling a thick environmental
impact statement that says little or nothing about
the externality costs of environmental hazards.
- Efficiency losses from misallocation of resources. If
the state eventually sides with the farmers, we
estimate a present value social loss of $5 million,
based on average parameter values. The loss could
top $100 million if energy prices rise substantially.
What might be a more appropriate role for
government land regulation in resolving rural land-
use disputes? An important function of a petition
process could be to identify costly externalities. A
constructive role for state regulators would be to focus
on externality costs and to use valuation techniques
that measure relative productivities. Public land-use
decisions based on other criteria can lead to
substantial economic losses.
John B. Crihfield is an assistant professor in the
Department of Agricultural Economics at the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the Institute of
Government and Public Affairs. Harrison S. Campbell,
Jr. is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Geography,
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THE STATES AND THEIR ECONOMIES IN A CHANGING NATIONAL CONTEXT
Paul Brace
Over the course of the last two decades issues
relating to state economic development have fueled
heated debates in state capitols throughout the
United States. This debate has continued largely
unresolved and has come to displace almost all other
issues in state politics. In this controversy,
policymakers are confronted with two distinct sets of
policy alternatives: to intervene in their state's
economy by developing programs to enhance
education, to train their citizens or promote physical
and technical infrastructure or; to resist intervention,
keep taxes low and create an environment where
market forces can stimulate their economy. The
debate continues unresolved largely because evidence
about the economic impact of either approach has
been ambiguous. Careful examination of American
history, however, reveals that there have been several
"eras" in state economic development. Recognition
of these eras, and the historically dynamic context of
state political economy, can make many of the issues
in the current state economic development debate
more understandable.
The Cycles of American History and the
Role of States in their Economic
Development
There are cycles in American history that affect state
and national economies. Hence while the states
must be seen in a national economic context, the
context itself is a cyclical one. The states and their
economies exist within a context that, through the
course of American history, has been differentially
influenced by the national government and national
economic conditions. These cycles have affected the
allocation of authority and activity at state and
federal levels. A. O. Hirschman (Shifting
Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action,
1982) reasons that these cycles are perpetuated by
alternating periods of conservatism and liberalism.
In conservative periods the federal government has
been restrained and state governments have taken on
many additional responsibilities. In liberal periods
the states have taken a back seat as the national
government assumed a more active role.
Cycles are also evident in the patterns of growth
displayed by the American states, as well as among
the regions of the United States. In some eras,
states which are politically and economically less
developed experience surges in economic growth. In
other eras these states are isolated from economic
prosperity centered in more developed parts of the
nation. Over the course of American history, the
national context has left the states in dramatically
dissimilar economic settings. These disparate
contexts have stimulated alternative responses by
states. It is uncertain whether this has led to
differential consequences in terms of economic
performance.
Unraveling the Role of States:
Context and State Capacity
National
The role of states in their economies becomes less
ambiguous when we consider two dimensions of state
economic development: national context and state
capacity. National context refers to the national
political and economic setting in which states exist.
This context is certainly not static but has been
shaped by cycles, with primary governmental
responsibilities oscillating between federal and state
levels over time. The nation's economy, too, may be
considered to have a national and state component.
In national economic eras all states mayexperience
growth, while in other eras growth may be
distributed sectorally, with some states outpacing
others.
With Cooperative Extension Service, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
State capacity is the governmental and political
resources available within a state to manage or
modify its economy. States vary dramatically in the
power and professionalism in their political
institutions, in the amounts they tax and spend, and
in the degree to which they intervene in their
economies. Some states score highly on almost all
of these attributes and others score very low. State
government capacity, furthermore, varies significantly
between the regions with southern and southwestern
states scoring quite low in all categories, and
northern and midwestern states scoring highly.
State capacity has a cost in terms of taxation to
support administration, infrastructure and state
intervention in the economy. States with greater
capacity would be at a comparative disadvantage
when growth was coming to the nation in general.
In such a context, those states with less capacity
would have a comparative cost advantage to those
financing much larger public sectors. In these eras,
neo-conservative laissez-faire interpretations of states
and their economies would seem to fit best: states
taxing, spending and intervening least would be
growing most.
The capacity of states may play a much different role
in a more challenging economic context. In a
national context where growth could not be taken
for granted, state effort to sustain growth could be
instrumental for economic progress. In these eras
the capacity of state government to invest, construct
and maintain infrastructure, educate its citizenry and
otherwise direct more substantial public resources in
economic intervention could be critical for
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stimulating state economic performance. The
influence of context and capacity are highlighted in
Table 1.
TABLE b STATE CAPACITY AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTEXT
STATE CAPACITY
High Low
Nationally
Dominant
NATIONAL
ECONOMIC CONTEXT
State
Dominant
Dependent Growth
Self-Sufficient Growth Decline
A New American Political Economy: Signs
of Change in the Contemporary Context
The American economy has been undergoing a
significant transformation. The changing structure of
American manufacturing and the increasing challenge
of international competition have created new
pressures for state officials. The nature and extent
of the national recession of the late 1970s, the early
1980s, and the early 1990s placed significant stress
on state governments. Increasingly, state
governments have sought to fill voids in the evolving
American economy. Adding to these pressures were
changing policy initiatives during the Reagan
administration that reduced the involvement of the
federal government in the private economy. Federal
budget deficits during the 1980s reduced the amount
of federal dollars available for domestic programs
and placed added demands on state governments.
A noteworthy feature of the new economy is the
reversal of a longstanding trend in growth in per
capita personal income. Throughout this century
disparities in per-capita income among the states
grew smaller and smaller. These disparities
diminished from the early 1930s to the late 1970s as
per capita incomes rose faster in low income states
than in high-income states. Poorer states, often
from the south and the west, were catching up with
their more developed counterparts in the northeast
and midwest. Since 1978 this fifty-year trend has
reversed.
The expansive role of the federal government
through the 1960s and the dominance of the
American economy in many of the world's markets
may have acted like a rising tide that lifted all boats.
At the state level much could be left to chance and
economic growth would still occur. Production
practices and technology would disperse to formerly
less developed states, stimulating more rapid
economic growth. Owing to past underdevelopment,
these states possessed attractive advantages that
served to stimulate their economic growth without
active economic intervention. Few states were
emphasizing economic development in this era.
The Reagan administration ushered in a new era of
national political conservatism. Reagan policies cut
federal grants and placed heavy reliance on the
states. Increasingly the states have had to shoulder
greater fiscal and programmatic burdens. In the
changing political-economic context of the 1980s,
many states have experienced significant reversals in
their economic fortunes. Part of this change may be
the result of the changed role of the federal
government. Where once the U.S. economy was
"nationalizing," with growth extending to almost all
states, states have now come to display increasing
inequalities in income. Growth in poorer states
slowed and politically and economically developed
states experienced heightened growth during the
1980s. During this period, many rich states have
gotten richer while many poorer states have fallen
behind. Typically, states that had experienced
awesome economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s,
often with limited government capacity and minimal
government intervention in their economies, were
now suffering stagnation. In this new era, states
with extensive traditions of government intervention
displayed heightened economic growth. These
developments have challenged many conventional
interpretations of the role of state government in
state economic growth.
The Contemporary Setting:
State Capacity in a Changing Context
Figure 1 maps the trade-offs between state and
national level growth since the late 1960s. State level
forces were relatively large in the 1968-1971 period
but dropped off momentously in 1972 to 1975 and
stayed very low through 1983. No doubt the oil
crisis of 1973 and the ensuing recessions and
stagflation plagued all states. From 1984 through
1989, state variation dwarfed national level
influences. The 1980s ushered in a dramatically
changed environment for the states. The graph in
Figure 2 makes this clear. As the figure illustrates,
the degree of dispersion among the states in their
rates of growth changed in the 1980s. Through 1979
there was increasing homogenization among the
states and the economy was "nationalizing" as the
states became increasingly equal in their levels of per
capita personal income. However, during the Reagan
era, and especially after 1982, the states exhibited
much greater heterogeneity in income.
Figure 1: State vs. National Variation:
Annual Change in Per Capita Personal
Income
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The obvious question is whether state political/
governmental attributes have played any role in
shaping economic growth in this new era. In an
extensive analysis of personal income growth, several
state influences were examined before and after 1982
to evaluate their changing effects. These
relationships are displayed in Table 2.
TABLE 1 THE IMPACT OF STATE CAPACITY ON GROWTH
IN PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME
Pre- 1982 1982-1989
Government Capacity + +
Economic Development Policy - +
Highway and Education Expenditures No effect +
Taxation No effect -
Government policies at the state level have become
more salient in the changed economic context
ushered in by the Reagan era. States with greater
governmental capacity, a larger number of economic
development policies and higher expenditures for
education and highways grew more rapidly in the
new economic era (since 1982). At the same time,
however, states with higher levels of per capita
taxation experienced slower growth. In the late
1980s, state attributes typically associated with
economic intervention came to have significant and
plausible effects on growth in per capita personal
income.
Policy Implications
One of the most remarkable developments in
contemporary American politics is the sharply-
different kinds of economic strategies that have
taken hold at the federal and state levels. At a time
when active, positive government intervention has
been in retreat in Washington, it has taken on new
life in the fifty state capitals. While the policies
adopted at the national level (e.g., deregulation,
privatization, the elimination of tax incentives, and a
turn away from discretionary forms of macro-
economic management) all have in common the
withdrawal of government from the economy, those
at the state level place government at the very center
of it. This irony has been largely overlooked with the
disproportionate attention paid to the resurgence of
conservative thinking in American politics that
started in the 1970s. The states have not only
embraced the liberal notion of affirmative
government, they have launched bold economic
development strategies that, even during liberalism's
heyday, were never tried at the national level, and
that today are championed by a lonely group of
"industrial policy" advocates on the periphery of
Washington's policy debate.
Instead of passively accepting prevailing economic
forces and federal economic policy as givens in their
environment, many state governments have sought to
anticipate economic change and take advantage of
them in ways that improve competitiveness.
Ultimately, of course, the goals of current economic
development policies are the same as they have
always been: a stable and growing economy, and
consequently, higher levels of income and
employment. Yet while the goals may remain the
same, the means to realizing those goals have
changed. Increasingly, the state level has come to
play a more significant role in stimulating growth in
per capita personal income.
*******
Paul Brace is an associate professor at the Institute of
Government and Public Affairs and in the Department
of Political Science at the University of Illinois at
Chicago.
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THE EPIDEMIC THEORY OF GHETTOS
Jonathan Crane
No matter how many times one sees the litanies of
statistics aimed at demonstrating just how bad social
problems are in urban ghettos, the numbers are truly
numbing. Over 70% of the families in Chicago's
South Side ghetto were headed by single mothers in
1980. At Orr High School, in the city's West Side
ghetto, only about a quarter of all the incoming
freshmen have graduated in recent years. Violent
crimes were 20 times more prevalent in Chicago's
Robert Taylor Homes public housing project than in
the rest of the city in 1980.
How can social problems get so out of hand in a
community? The term "epidemic" is often used in
popular parlance to describe problems in ghettos.
The media are filled with feature stories on "crack
epidemics," "gang murder epidemics," and "teenage
childbearing epidemics." Though the term is used
loosely, the analogy does apply in a more rigorous
way. In fact, I propose that the very thing which
defines a ghetto is that it is a neighborhood that
has experienced an epidemic of social problems.
This proposition is what I call, "the epidemic
theory of ghettos."
The Theory
The theory is predicated on a mathematical model of
the dynamics of social problems. The basic
assumption of the model is that social problems are
contagious. Among adolescents, they spread through
peer pressure. The mathematics of the model
demonstrate how epidemics of social problems can
occur. The key mathematical result of the model is
that the contagion process has the potential to
generate "critical-mass" type phenomena. That is, if
the incidence of a social problem stays below a certain
level in a population, it will tend to remain relatively
low. But if it reaches that critical level, the problem
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will spin out of control. The incidence of the problem
won't just rise a little bit. It will leap up to a much
higher level. In other words, an epidemic occurs.
While the formal model may seem a little daunting for
someone who isn't comfortable with the language of
mathematics, the basic idea is extremely simple, if we
just think in terms of the disease analogy implied by
the word "epidemic." Consider how a flu spreads in a
community. If just a few people get it, by random
chance, not many other people in the community will
be exposed. The rate of recovery will exceed the rate
of exposure. Few people will get it, and pretty soon
the virus will die out. But if just enough people get
it, then all of a sudden everyone starts giving it to
everybody else. The rate of infection will exceed the
rate of recovery. People get it faster than others
recover, so more and more people are exposed. Thus
more and more individuals get infected, and the
exposure rate grows even higher. The process spirals
out of hand. In other words, an epidemic breaks out.
The analogy isn't perfect, because people don't usually
recover from social problems the way they do from flu,
as part of the natural course of the disease. But it can
be shown mathematically that this doesn't make any
difference as far as the epidemic phenomenon goes. It
just works a little bit differently.
Testing the Theory
We can test the epidemic theory by determining
whether or not its key prediction is borne out in
reality. This prediction is that living in a ghetto, as
opposed to any other neighborhood in the city, will
increase the risk that individuals will develop social
problems by tremendous amounts. To carry out this
test, I used a slight variation of the basic statistical
technique of linear regression. The idea is to estimate
the effect that moving from a higher quality
neighborhood to a lower quality one would have on
the probability that an average individual will develop
a specific social problem. The "average individual" is
defined as one who has average socioeconomic
characteristics, such as family income, parents'
educational attainment, and household size, among
others.
In this analysis, neighborhood quality is defined as the
percentage of working adults in the community who
held professional or managerial jobs (%HIGH
STATUS). I used this particular index because it was
a better predictor of dropout rates than any of the
other 15 indices that I tried, including more
conventional ones such as the neighborhood poverty
rate or median income. The fact that this particular
measure worked best is consistent with William Julius
Wilson's central hypothesis in his highly celebrated
book, The Truly Disadvantaged . There he argues that
social problems became much worse in inner city black
neighborhoods in the sixties and seventies, because
middle class blacks moved out when housing
opportunities opened up elsewhere. Thus we would
expect the worst neighborhoods (in terms of social
problems) to be those with the lowest proportion of
middle class people.
Figure 1 shows the estimated effect that declining
neighborhood quality had on the probability that
average teenagers (16-19 years olds) would drop out of
high school in the 17 largest American cities (using
data from the 1970 Census). We can see that the
estimated dropout risk of an average black teenager
rose steadily at a moderate pace as neighborhood
quality fell from the very best group of neighborhoods
to the second worst category. The dropout risk then
leapt up between the second worst group of
neighborhoods and the very worst.
Anna J. Merritt, Managing Editor
IGPA University of Illinois
1201 West Nevada Street
Urbana, IL 61801
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This is exactly what the epidemic theory predicts: the
dropout probability should jump sharply in those poor
neighborhoods that experience epidemics, i.e. the
ghettos.
More precisely, the dropout risk rose from .063 to
.145 as the percentage of high status workers in the
neighborhood fell more than twenty-three percentage
points, from 28.1% to 5.0%. But then, as %HIGH
STATUS fell just one-and-a-half percentage points
more, to 3.4%, the risk shot up to .226. What this
suggests is that an average black teenager who moved
from a very poor, but non-ghetto neighborhood to a
ghetto would suffer just as much increase in dropout
risk as one who moved from the very best
neighborhood to a very poor but non-ghetto one. The
rate of increase in the dropout probability for each
percentage point change in %HIGH STATUS was
almost fifteen times greater from the second worst
category to the worst as it was from the very best to
the second worst.
The pattern is essentially the same for white teenagers.
The dropout probability of an average white teen rose
gradually from .041 in the very best neighborhoods to
.103 in poor non-ghetto neighborhoods. It then
jumped to .177 in ghettos. Just a tiny fraction of
white teenagers lived in ghettos. But the ones who
did were not immune to epidemics of dropping out.
Given the particular intensity of social problems
among black male teenagers in ghettos, we would
expect to find that epidemics are especially large
among them. Figure 2 shows the relationship between
estimated dropout probabilities and neighborhood
quality among 16-19 year old black males with average
socioeconomic characteristics in the 17 largest
American cities. As predicted, the basic pattern was
the same, but it was accentuated. The dropout risk of
an average black male teenager increased from .071 in
the best neighborhoods to .147 in poor but non-ghetto
ones. But the risk then exploded to .344 in ghettos.
Thus, the difference between a poor non-ghetto
neighborhood and a ghetto was almost three times
greater than the difference between one of the best
communities and a poor non-ghetto one. The rate of
increase for each one percentage point change in
%HIGH STATUS was almost 40 times greater
between the bottom two categories than it was from
the top to the second to the bottom.
In sum, the epidemic theory passes the test with flying
colors. While this does not definitively prove the
theory, it does offer strong support for it.
contagiousness of social problems. Another important
implication of the model is that rates of social
problems have a natural tendency to settle at self-
reinforcing "set-points." In a sense, these set-points
have a certain kind of gravity. If the rate of social
problems is pushed away from them by some event or
force, the rate will tend to fall back toward the set-
point naturally. But just as the gravity of a planet
isn't inescapable, neither is the gravity of a set-point.
If the rate is pushed beyond a critical point, it will
move toward a different set-point. This is shown in
Figure 3. If the rate of the social problem is at any
level below the critical point, it will tend to move
toward the low set-point. If the rate is at any level
above the critical point, it will tend to move toward
the high set-point.
figure 3 The Dgnemica of Petes of Social Problems in 1he Contagion Model
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SPopuletion in the Community who hove the Sociol Problem
Suppose for example that the crime rate in a
community is at the low set-point. Then some
important event occurs, for example the closing of a
large factory which employed many people in the
community. Unemployment increases and then crime
docs too. If the crime rate is pushed up above the
critical point, it will then begin to spiral up toward the
high set-point. In other words, the factory closing
generates an epidemic of crime.
Policy Implications of the Theory
The epidemic theory suggests that we should target
two types of neighborhoods that have already
undergone epidemics, i.e. those that have become
ghettos; and neighborhoods that are at high risk. The
nature of the intervention should be different for the
two types of communities, specifically in terms of the
pattern of resource investment.
Recall that the epidemic theory is an implication
of a mathematical model which characterizes the
Reversing an Epidemic. Now consider what this
process suggests about the effects of policies aimed at
ameliorating social problems in ghettos. Suppose that
after the epidemic, we try to reduce the crime rate in
the community through some policy intervention. If
the intervention reduces the rate to some extent but
not below the critical point, the rate will tend to move
back to the high set-point on its own. But if the
intervention is effective enough to push the rate past
the critical point, it will then tend to fall toward the
low set-point. And once it reaches that low set-point,
it will tend to stay there. In that case, the policy
would, in a sense, have generated a reverse epidemic
in which the crime rate falls as sharply as it rose after
the factory closed.
But to do this, we have to be willing to invest
"enough" resources.
• A policy intervention that is large but not quite
large enough is little better than no intervention at
all, because if the policy fails to reduce the problem
enough, the rate will tend to revert back to a high
set-point on its own. What is "enough"? The rate
has to be pushed below the critical point.
• Policies aimed at reducing the social problems of
ghettos have to be funded at very high levels,
relative to the number of people they serve. But
this prescription is not quite as pessimistic as it
sounds at first because once the social problems can
be reduced to their low set-points, most of the
resources can be moved to other ghettos.
• Given the tight budgets of our times, we should
attempt to deal with the social problems of ghettos
through a strategy of "sequential saturation." In
other words, we should concentrate our resources on
a certain fraction of ghettos at a time, rather than
spreading limited resources too thin across all of
them at once. An initial fraction of neighborhoods
should be helped until they reach their low set-
points of social problems. Once attained, these low
levels would be relatively inexpensive to maintain,
because of the natural gravity of the set-points. The
resources could then be transferred to other ghettos.
Using this strategy, the total expense would not have
to be that large, even if the number of dollars spent
per person was huge.
If we spread our resources too thin and spend too
little on a per capita basis, our policies will fail, and
no one will be helped. Perhaps, even worse, such a
failure would strengthen the myth that government
can't do anything about ghettos and ghetto poverty,
and we would return to our present policy of neglect.
Conversely, even a single success might increase
support for social spending in ghettos substantially.
Preventing an Epidemic. Another implication of the
set-point phenomenon is that it is relatively
inexpensive to prevent epidemics in "communities at-
risk." Not all poor neighborhoods are ghettos. But
poor neighborhoods are far more vulnerable than
affluent ones to social and economic shocks like
recessions, plant shut-downs, changes in the pattern of
housing values, etc. They all have a relatively high
risk of suffering an epidemic of social problems. Thus
we should establish programs in these communities
aimed at preventing such epidemics. But they needn't
be nearly as intensive or expensive as the programs we
develop for ghettos, because the gravity of the low set-
points in these neighborhoods already offers some
degree of natural prevention. Thus we should take the
opposite approach when allocating resources among
these communities. We can afford to spread resources
out among all neighborhoods at risk, because as is
often the case, preventing problems is much cheaper
than solving them.
********
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ENTERPRISE ZONES IN ILLINOIS
John F. McDonald
The use of tax incentives to stimulate economic growth
at the state and local levels has a long history, but
enterprise zone programs are of recent vintage. The
first proposal for enterprise zones was made in 1978
by Sir Geoffrey Howe, a Conservative member of the
British House of Commons who later served in the
Thatcher government. Stuart Butler, a researcher with
The Heritage Foundation, introduced the idea in the
U. S. in 1979, and Jack Kemp, the former conservative
Republican congressman and current Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, immediately became
a strong advocate for the proposal. The basic idea of
an enterprise zone program is to provide tax incentives
and regulatory relief to businesses located in depressed
parts of urban areas. Kemp and his congressional
colleagues did not succeed in creating a federal
program. A bill was passed in 1988, but it did not
provide for any tax incentives. The designation of
federal enterprise zones is awaiting the passage of
some new bill. The creation of a federal enterprise
zone program is now high on the agenda in
Washington partly in response to the recent rioting in
Los Angeles. However, the enterprise zone idea was
received enthusiastically by many state and local
officials, and an enterprise zone program in some form
now exists in 37 states. The experiences of the states
can now provide information to the federal
government.
The Illinois Enterprise Zone Program
The first bill to create an enterprise zone program in
Illinois was introduced in the legislature in 1979.
Three years of negotiation and compromise were
needed before a program was formulated that was
acceptable to the legislature and the governor. The
Illinois Enterprise Zone Act took effect on December
7, 1982, and the first eight enterprise zones were
certified on July 1, 1983. As stated in the Act, the
purpose of the program is to "explore ways and
means of stimulating business and industrial growth
and retention in depressed areas of the state by means
of relaxed government controls and tax incentives in
those areas." The Illinois Department of Commerce
and Community Affairs (DCCA) is the state agency
responsible for the administration of the program, but
local governments, in conjunction with local
community groups, select program objectives and
administer the program on a day-to-day basis. The
original Enterprise Zone Act limited enterprise zones
to ten contiguous square miles, limited the life of an
enterprise zone to 20 years, and authorized the
creation of eight enterprise zones per year for six
years. Up until 1992, the Act has been amended each
year to allow the creation of more enterprise zones; 12
were certified in 1984, 12 in 1985, and 13 in 1986. As
of the end of 1991, there were 88 enterprise zones in
Illinois. Except in two special cases, DCCA has
awarded enterprise zone designation based on a high
unemployment rate (20% greater than the state
average), low income, poverty, or population loss.
The incentives offered in enterprise zones by the state
of Illinois are listed in Table 1; other incentives apply
statewide. Enterprise zone incentives such as property
tax abatements and reduced rates for building permits
are also offered by local and county governments. The
most frequently used components of the program are
the sales tax exemptions on building supplies, the
income tax credit for investment in machinery,
equipment or buildings, and the local property tax
abatements. Consequently, the program tends to
promote investment in structures.
With Cooperative Extension Service, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Table 1
Illinois Enterprise Zone Incentives
1. Exemption of the 7 percent sales tax on building
materials used by businesses in an enterprise zone.
2. State income tax credit of 0.5 percent for
investment in machinery, equipment, or buildings
used in the enterprise zone.
3. State income tax deduction for a) interest received
by financial institutions on loans for enterprise
zone developments, b) dividends received from a
corporation conducting essentially all of its
business in a zone, and c) contributions (at double
the value) for an approved project being
undertaken by a Designated Zone Organization.
4. State income tax credit of $500 for each job
created in a zone if at least five jobs are created
and certified dislocated or disadvantaged workers
are hired to fill them.
5. Exemption of state utility taxes and state sales
taxes on materials and machinery used in
manufacturing processes or pollution control
(available to certain qualified large businesses
only).
Anna J. Merritt, Managing Editor
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DCCA recognized at the outset that the incentives
offered by the program were not designed to have
large effects on investment and employment, but it was
hoped that there would be some stimulation of
economic activity in depressed areas of the state even
if that meant some reduction in economic growth in
other areas of the state. The program had, as one of
its original goals, the promotion of a more equitable
spatial distribution of growth in the local tax base and
employment. Is there evidence that the program
stimulated economic activity in the enterprise zones?
Enterprise Zones in Downstate Counties
This section and the next one report briefly on a study
that attempts to determine whether the program
generated a net addition to economic activity in the
enterprise zones. This evaluation concentrates on the
enterprise zones that were created in the first years of
the program, and begins with an examination of
downstate counties (counties outside the six-county
Chicago metropolitan area). The county unit is
chosen to avoid two problems that have hampered
efforts to evaluate local economic development
programs. First, some observers argue that enterprise
zones simply shift economic activity a short distance.
The use of data at the county level eliminates most of
the short-distance location shifts. Second, since
enterprise zones are rather small (less than 10 square
miles in area), choosing a large area for study might
mean that enterprise zone impacts within that area are
difficult to detect. The county unit appears to be a
good compromise choice for downstate areas.
Downstate counties are categorized according to
whether they contain an enterprise zone that was
certified during 1983-85. Fourteen counties qualify
and meet other selection criteria, and these are
compared to counties that did not contain an
enterprise zone during the 1983-87 period. In
examining the enterprise zone program, it is important
to recognize that the program was enacted in late
1982, at the end of the deepest recession of the post
World War II period. Because the program was
designed to assist depressed areas of the state, the
counties in the "experimental" group are not a random
sample of counties in terms of their immediate past
economic performance. The 14 counties are listed in
Table 2.
Table 2
Enterprise Zones Included in the Study
County Year Zone Zone Area CBD in Zone*
Certified (sq. mi.)
Fulton 1983 1.0 yes
Macon 1983 9.3 yes
Peoria 1983 6.3 no
Winnebago 1983 9.0 yes
Kankakee 1984 9.2 yes
Knox 1984 1.6 yes
Pulaski 1984 2.1 yes
Sangamon 1984 3.2 no
St. Clair** 1983,85 18.3 yes
Vermilion 1984 4.7 yes
Adams 1985 9.9 yes
Rock Island 1985 1.5 yes
Wabash 1985 .8 no
Warren 1985 .7 no
* Central Business District.
** St. Clair County has two Enterprise Zones; one in
E. St. Louis was certified in 1983 and one in Belleville
was certified in 1985.
Total employment in the 14 enterprise zone counties
declined by an average of 8.3% from 1979 to 1983
compared to an average of only 1.5% in 73 other
downstate counties. Enterprise zone counties
experienced steep declines in manufacturing
employment (29.1% on average) during this period
compared to a decline of 13.3% for the other counties.
The period of 1983-87 presents a sharp contrast with
the prior four-year period. Total employment
increased by an average of 6.0% in the enterprise zone
counties compared to 5.3% growth in the other
counties. Manufacturing employment in enterprise
zone counties continued to decline (by 15.7%) and
lagged behind the 5.1% growth in the other counties.
However, employment in the distribution sector
(transportation and wholesale trade) increased 16.2%
in the enterprise zone counties compared to 5.4% for
the other counties. Employment growth for other
sectors in enterprise zone counties did not differ
significantly from the growth recorded in other
counties.
Enterprise Zones in Cook County
Twelve enterprise zones had been certified in Cook
County as of 1986 - six in the city of Chicago and six
in the southern and western suburbs. The enterprise
zones located in the suburbs are in Chicago Heights,
Cicero, Harvey, McCook/Hodgkins, Summit/Bedford
Park, and the Cal-Sag Channel area (Blue Island,
Robbins, et al.). Employment trends in the areas
covered by these enterprise zones are compared to
otherwise similar areas of the county. The period of
the study is 1985-89.
Statistical analysis reveals that the enterprise zone
program had no impact on total private employment
during the 1985-89 period. However, employment
growth in the distribution sector (transportation and
wholesale trade) was much higher in enterprise zones
than in other areas of the county during this period.
Employment growth in this sector averaged 32.5% in
the enterprise zone areas compared to 5.4% in
otherwise similar areas. This finding for the
distribution sector probably stems from the fact that
the property tax incentive offered by Cook County
zeroes in on this sector in enterprise zones. A
property tax incentive is offered to manufacturing
located anywhere in the county. Industrial property in
an enterprise zone that is not engaged in
manufacturing production activity (e.g., engaged in
transportation of or wholesale trade in manufactured
products) is eligible for a property tax incentive that
lowers the property tax by 56% for eight years and by
17% for four additional years. This incentive applies
to new, substantially rehabilitated, or formerly
abandoned property. Other types of businesses are
generally not eligible for a property tax incentive in
Cook County. Enterprise zone designation had no
statistically significant effect on employment in
manufacturing, retail trade, or finance, insurance and
real estate (FIRE)/services.
A survey of firms located in four Cook County
enterprise zones found that program participants
mentioned the importance of the property tax
incentive. Some 61% of those firms that used the
property tax incentive (and responded to the survey)
answered that this feature was a critical factor in the
decision to invest. In contrast, only 17% of firms that
used any enterprise zone incentive indicated that an
incentive was of critical importance.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The central issue is whether the enterprise zone
program has generated economic activity that would
not have existed in the enterprise zone in the absence
of the program. The results suggest very strongly that
both the enterprise zone counties outside of
metropolitan Chicago and the enterprise zones in
Cook County experienced growth in the distribution
sector that was considerably greater than in
comparison areas. It is thus very likely that enterprise
zones attracted economic activity in this sector that
they would not otherwise have attracted. The
distribution sector was characterized by rapid growth
during the period under study and by sizable demands
for investment in real estate capital. The enterprise
zone incentives (and the Cook County property tax •
incentive inside enterprise zones) appear to be
targeted at industries with these characteristics.
However, there is no evidence that the enterprise zone
program stimulated total private employment.
The Illinois experience with enterprise zones suggests
three additional conclusions.
• The original focus of the program has been lost.
With 88 enterprise zones now in existence, the
program can hardly claim to focus on depressed
areas, and it will be less successful at stimulating
investment and employment in depressed areas if
other areas of the state also contain enterprise
zones.
The emphasis on subsidizing capital investment
should be reconsidered. For example, larger wage
subsidies and job training programs might be
needed if the objective is to stimulate employment
in enterprise zones.
The state should keep records concerning the cost
of the enterprise zone program. It was not
possible to retrieve data on the sales tax
exemptions and the state income tax deductions
and credits earned by the participating firms. This
lack of information means that the benefits of the
program cannot be compared to its costs. It also
means that the responses of firms cannot be related
to the magnitudes of the tax expenditure incentives
in the program.
John F. McDonald is Professor of Economics at the
University of Illinois at Chicago and a faculty affiliate of
IGPA. Further information about Enterprise Zones in
Illinois can be obtained from the author.
Printed on recycled paper.
Policy Forum
Institute of Government and Public Affairs
University of Illinois
1007 West Nevada Street
Urbana, IL 61801
The University of Illinois is an affirmative action/equal opportunity institution.




